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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROACHES TO THE ROOT CAUSES 
 
OF STATE FAILURE AND COLLAPSE 
 
 
Yumlu, Seda  
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Pınar Bilgin 
September 2012 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, failed states have increasingly been viewed 
as a cause for concern for the international system due to numerous 
humanitarian and security challenges they created. Since then, a variety of 
international responses have been attempted and proposed by the 
international community to address state failure. The ongoing nature of the 
phenomenon of state failure and security threats they cause prove that state 
failure is an entrenched problem for the 21st century. This thesis focuses on 
the analysis of root causes of state failure in the literature and examines 
different approaches to it. In doing so, it aims to make a comprehensive 
literature review categorized by historical, global political, individual-
centered and critical approaches. 
 
Key Words: State Failure, State Collapse, Root Causes, International 
Community, Security  
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ÖZET 
 
DEVLET BAŞARISIZLIĞI VE ÇÖKÜŞÜNÜN TEMEL 
SEBEPLERİNE İLİŞKİN YAKLAŞIMLAR 
 
Yumlu, Seda  
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Pınar Bilgin 
Eylül 2012 
 
 
Soğuk Savaş’ı izleyen dönemde, başarısız devletler yarattıkları sayısız insani 
ve güvenlik sorunları nedeniyle uluslararası sistem tarafından giderek artan 
bir endişe kaynağı olarak görüldüler. O zamandan beri, uluslararası toplum 
tarafından devlet başarısızlığına yönelik çeşitli uluslararası tepkiler ortaya 
kondu ve önerildi. Devlet başarısızlığı olgusunun devam eden doğası ve 
neden oldukları güvenlik tehditleri, devlet başarısızlığının 21. yüzyıl için 
yerleşik bir sorun olduğunu kanıtlamıştır. Bu tez devlet başarısızlığının 
literatürdeki temel nedenlerine odaklanmakta ve buna yönelik farklı 
yaklaşımları incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken, tarihsel, küresel politik, birey 
merkezli ve eleştirel yaklaşımlara göre kategorize edilmiş kapsamlı bir 
literatür taraması yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Devlet Başarısızlığı, Devlet Çöküşü, Temel Sebepler, 
Uluslararası Toplum, Güvenlik 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
With the end of the world order that Cold War provided, a greater degree of 
state breakdown occurred in the mid-1990s. States failed to perform certain 
minimal functions for security and well-being of their citizens. While this 
crisis in statehood is frequently portrayed as primarily internal in nature 
(Copson, 1994; Zartman 1995), its origins and ramifications involved entire 
regions. Compared to the earlier periods, the state breakdown that emerged 
during 1990s became more rampant and destructive because their 
implications have involved both the state and the region (Zartman, 2000). As 
the political violence and conflicts has increased, the literature has been 
concerned with identifying why the state itself ceases to perform core 
functions. 
After Gerald B. Helman and Steven Ratner 1  published their article  
‚Saving Failed States‛ in Foreign Policy in 1992, the new concept of ‚failed 
                                                          
1
 Gerald B. Helman was a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and deputy to 
the under-secretary of state for political affairs. He retired from Foreign Service. Steven R. 
Ratner is a Professor in University of Michigan Law School since 2004. 
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state‛ gained a prominence among diplomats, politicians, academics. 
Thereafter, the term ‚state failure‛ became entrenched in literature and in 
Alex Gourevitch’s words: 
was held responsible for just about every threat to international 
peace and security that existed: civil war, mass migration, ethnic 
conflict, environmental degradation, drug smuggling, arm 
trafficking and terrorism (Gourevitch, 2004: 255).  
 
Although it was initially focused on the African states, state failure 
and weakness were embraced as global concerns after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. Especially after these terrorist attacks, ‚failed states as 
security threats‛ discourse has intensified among scholars and government 
authorities. Since then, the concept has been utilized as a means of foreign 
policy tool in policy statements. In its National Security Strategy, Bush 
administration identified failed states as the major threatening element, even 
more serious than the conquering states (The White House, 2002). The 
concern was also explained by British Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Jack Straw in September 2002. Straw said that ‚West 
must help rebuilding failed states and prevent them falling prey to terrorist 
leaders‛. He argued that where states are weakest, terrorists are the 
strongest, therefore they can find safe havens in any state where government 
and society have collapsed (Guardian, 2002). In 2005, a report entitled 
Investing in Prevention was published by Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in 
Britain which presents a strategy to prevent these states from failing (Cabinet 
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Office, 2005). In a similar manner, National Security Strategy of 2006 
recognized that US security depends upon partnering with Africans to 
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the 
control of effective democracies. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
stated that weak and failings states pose ‚unparalleled‛ danger to the United 
States, serving as ‚global pathways‛ that facilitate the spread of pandemics, 
the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world’s 
most dangerous weapons in an article in Washington Post. Senator Chuck 
Hagel (2004, 64) argued that terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing 
states and existing and future challenges ‚come not from rival global powers, 
but from weak states‛. In 2003, concerning the issue of Solomon Islands,  
Australian Prime Minister expressed a similar concern like Bush 
Administration’s National Security Strategy. He announced that if nothing is 
done now, the Solomon Islands becomes a failed state, thus international 
drug dealers, money launderers and international terrorism will make the 
problem in the future more costly (Kabutaulaka, 2004). In ASEAN Regional 
Forum report, Australian government also said that  
We have come to understand better the impact of weak and failing 
states can have on global security. Afghanistan illustrated the role 
such states can play in providing shelter for terrorist networks 
(Anon., 2004). 
 
Susan Rice, U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy adviser, 
coauthored a major study of failed states for the Brookings Institution. She 
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argued that U.S. officials now understand that ‚weak states deserve 
particular attention because they can incubate transnational security threats‛ 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008: 21). State failure is thus a serious concern for 
government officials and leaders by causing security challenges for their 
state. 
In academic literature, scholars also emphasized the discourse of 
‚failed states as security threats‛. Robert Rotberg (2002: 85), points out that 
failed states create a convenient environment for sheltering non-state actors 
such as warlords and terrorists. In stressing the potent relationship between 
illicit global flows and failed states, Mark Duffield (2000: 84) argues that 
‚warlords and failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think 
globally‛. Similarly, Gary King and Langche Zeng (2001: 623) argue that 
failed states threaten the stability of neighboring countries by safeguarding 
international terrorists and allowing them to organize within their borders. 
According to the empirical study of James A. Piazza states plagued by 
chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that 
commit transnational attacks and targeted by terrorists (2008: 469) 2. Ray 
Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev (2002: 98) think that failed states attract 
terrorist organizations. Their territories are enough to accommodate entire 
training complexes, arms depots and communication facilities. Terrorist 
                                                          
2 James Piazza (2008) used a simple descriptive statistics and a time series, cross-national 
negative binomial analysis of 197 countries from 1973 to 2003. 
 5 
 
groups simply want to acquire de facto control over specified areas where 
they will be left alone and in this regard failed states becomes the most 
convenient disposition for them according to Takeyh and Gvosdev. 
These examples from policy and academic circles indicate that, state 
failure has become particularly associated with the global insecurities since 
9/11. At the same time, the understanding of security threats has changed 
too. According to foreign policy officials of the United States, twentieth 
century threats no longer lie in the strength of the enemies, but, on the 
contrary, the weakness of the other countries pose the gravest danger to the 
nation-state (Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein, 2005: 134). This kind of 
weakness is considered to have allowed small arms trade to flourish 
throughout Central Asia, made al Qaeda to exploit Somalia and Pakistan as 
terrorist grounds for attacks and heightened opium production in 
Afghanistan. In such a conjuncture, understanding the factors behind state 
failure is important for preventing a further disintegration of the state and 
restoring the collapsed states. 
 Studies of state failure have mainly sought to identify, describe and 
explain the areas of the weakness of these states in an attempt to understand 
the triggers of state failure/collapse and its prevention. Another group of 
studies focus on state reconstruction and policies that should be 
implemented. Indeed, there is a huge proliferation of concepts designating 
state malfunction in the literature. In this literature, states are often portrayed 
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in different categories: ‚failing‛ or ‚fragile‛ (Jackson, 1990; Brock, 2000; Ikpe, 
2007), ‚collapsed‛ (Zartman, 1995), ‚hollow‛ (Terry, 2005), ‚at risk‛ 
(Ottoway and Mair, 2004), ‚weak‛ (Migdal, 1988; Buzan, 1991; Rotberg, 
2004), ‚shadow‛ (Reno, 2000), ‚quasi‛ (Krasner and Pascual, 2005), ‚under-
consolidated‛ (Carment, 2003), ‚minimal‛ (Desch, 1996). In this taxonomy of 
states, Gros (1996) distinguishes between ‚anarchic‛, ‚phantom‛, ‚anaemic‛, 
‚captured‛ and ‚aborted‛ states and illustrates a diversity both in causation 
and manifestation of state failure.  
 These categorization attempts point to an ongoing challenge to 
identify the meaning of weakness in reference to the state. At the core of the 
conceptual disagreement is whether weak and failed states are distinct 
categories. According to Robinson, ‚a weak state is a form of failed state‛ 
(2007: 6). Yet, others point to a distinction not just between weak and failed 
states, but also between failed and collapsed states. In general, a collapsed 
state is taken as a rare and extreme version of the failed state (Rotberg, 2003; 
Milliken and Krause, 2002) where ‚the basic functions of the states are no 
longer performed‛ (Zartman, 1995). In this regard, state weakness can be 
defined as the diminished or diminishing performance of a state, while state 
failure can be identified as the malfunction of the one or more state functions. 
This thesis aims to take a closer look at the phenomenon of the failed 
state and the root causes behind it. The research question of the thesis is why 
and how some states fail or collapse, while some others do not. Thus, the 
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thesis will present an overview of multiple perspectives including historical, 
global political, socio psychological and critical. The thesis does not present 
new solutions. Nor does it make policy recommendations. The thesis offers a 
comprehensive literature review on state failure with an effort to understand 
root causes of state failure as analyzed in the literature. While presenting this 
comprehensive literature review, the concepts of failed, failing or collapsed 
are not taken as different terms, but used interchangeably. There exists a 
huge ambiguity in the literature on defining these terms, therefore it will be 
futile to deal with them separately.  
This thesis composed of four chapters. Chapters are organized 
thematically in accordance with their comprehensiveness of various factors 
from least to the most comprehensive. In each chapter, key authors’ 
arguments are presented. 
Chapter 1 looks at the literature that focuses on human actors and the 
role their decision making play in mismanagement of governance. The 
chapter looks at four main scholars of this approach: Robert Jackson and Carl 
Rosberg, William Zartman, William Reno and Robert Rotberg. Their 
distinctive argument is that regime failure and mismanagement of leaders 
can lead to state failure.  
 Chapter 2 focus on the literature that looks at the colonial legacy of 
states and emphasizes how these can affect a state’s contemporary status. 
European colonial system, territorial settlements, demarcation of boundaries, 
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and decolonization has had a huge impact on state’s current situation. In this 
chapter, James Mayall, Charles Alao, Christopher Clapham and Jeffrey 
Herbst’s studies are focused upon. 
 Chapter 3 presents the literature that focuses on the global, economic 
and historical environment in which the roots of the structural crisis are 
located. This literature looks at how globalization, global economic practices, 
and development aids that other states provides as well as global capitalist 
networks and legacy of colonial transformation can led to the state failure. 
The studies of Percy Mistry, Nicholas Van de Walle and Branwen Gruffydd 
Jones are presented in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the literature that looks at the state failure issue 
from a critical theoretical perspective. The literature covered in the previous 
chapters all accept that all states are constituted and function in the same 
way: ‚failed‛ and ‚successful‛ or ‚weak‛ and ‚strong‛. However, the related 
question that is asked is not ‚Is the state failing?‛ but rather was ‚For whom 
is the state failing, and how?‛ Taken together, the literature covered in the 
previous three chapters assumes that states are failing by developing 
strategies to reconstitute them or by making policy recommendations. But, 
this chapter presents the critical theoretical literature which maintains that 
the real problem is the fixed understanding of how states should function 
and behave. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, Morten Bøås and Kathleen 
Jennings’ studies will be analyzed in this chapter. 
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 This thesis specifically focuses on the phenomenon of state failure and 
state collapse because the issue still poses a risk to the international system 
by creating numerous challenges. The violent conflicts, diseases, human 
rights abuses, poverty, refugee flows and civil wars accompanying state 
failure attest that the issue is problematic. By looking at different approaches 
that embrace state failure, this thesis will present a comprehensive overview 
of the literature focusing on the root causes of state failure. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LEADERSHIP FAILURE AND REGIME MALFUNCTION 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the literature produced by a group of scholars who 
argue that it is personal rule and mismanagement of the individual leaders 
or their authoritarian regimes that are the root causes of the failure (Rotberg, 
2002; Reno, 2002; Zartman, 1995; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Rotberg (2003) 
argues that states fail because of the corrupt policies of the rulers, therefore 
the phenomenon is entirely caused by the human agency. Zartman (1995) 
contends that regime is a significant factor as well as leadership, thus the 
authoritative nature of the governments and tyranny are influential factors 
for state failure. William Reno’s (2002) analysis introduced the term ‚shadow 
state‛ where the authority of an individual figure undermines government 
institutions through patron-client networks. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) 
argue that the personal rule system in which web of relations between rulers, 
patrons, public and rivals turn into an environment of insecurity rendering 
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leaders inefficient authoritarian rulers. The common point of these authors is 
that leaders and their decisions play a crucial role in weakening the state 
structure. However, while Rotberg (2003) thinks that leaders are solely 
responsible for state failure, Zartman (1995) argues that authoritative regimes 
in post-colonial Africa are also contributing factors for failure. Reno (2000, 
2002) presents a complicated network where the presence of patron-client 
relationships gradually weakens state and argues that lack of knowledge and 
experience cause leaders to act irresponsibly. On the other hand, Jackson and 
Rosberg’s (1982) analysis of ‚personal rule‛ model presents a framework 
where long surviving political leaders deliberately adopt strategies to keep 
their states weak in order not to lose their position. Therefore, leaders are 
depicted by these scholars as ambitious and corrupt rulers who do not 
hesitate to apply strategies to strengthen their grip on political power.   
 
2.2 Jackson and Rosberg’s Personal Rule Model  
 
Carl G. Rosberg was a pioneer in the study of African politics in the United 
States. He led the Center for African Studies at Berkeley for many years. He 
was also the Chair of the Department of Political Science, 1969-1974 and the 
director of the Institute of International Studies, 1973-1989 at the Berkeley 
faculty. He also held positions at three African universities, namely, 
Makerere, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. He died at the age of 73 in 1996. 
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Robert H. Jackson is a Professor in the Department of International 
Relations and Department of Political Science at Boston University since 
2001. His areas of interest are international relations of the Third World and 
post-colonial African politics. He has lectured at universities in North 
America, Europe and Africa and has served on university and government 
consultancies in Britain, Canada and Denmark. He also serves on the 
editorial boards of Political Science, International Relations, European 
Journal of International Relations, and Humanistic Perspectives on 
International Relations. He has co-authored a widely adopted textbook: 
Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (2nd ed 2003).  
Jackson and Rosberg co-wrote books and articles that emphasize 
issues such as democracy, sovereignty, statehood and multi-ethnicity in 
Africa. Their studies which will be looked at in this thesis are Personal Rule 
in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (1982) and ‚Personal Rule: 
Theory and Practice in Africa‛ (1984). 
 As defined by Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 19) ‚personal rule‛ is a 
type of political system of relations linking rulers not with the public or 
even with the ruled, but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and 
rivals who constitute the system. They argued that the system is structured 
by the politicians and unlike the relationship between patron-client that 
Reno explained, personal rule model does not mention the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled. Furthermore, this distinctive kind of 
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system is more open to interferences caused by changes of personnel. 
Rather than institutions, this system is ultimately dependent on persons 
(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 19). Therefore, any change in ruling elites 
creates changes in this web of persons. 
Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 17) argue that in spite of their different 
personal characteristics, belief sets or ambitions, most African leaders 
display similar features of behavior engendering their states to fail. They 
think that similar attitudes of the leaders actually form generic 
characteristics that establishes personal rule as distinctive kind of political 
system. They accept that personal rule is only one dimension to explain 
weak states in African political life, yet they think that it is crucial because it 
sheds light on the patronage and clientelism, factionalism, succession crises 
and coups that other approaches neglect. They argue that the independence 
of these African states was a fundamental change not only leading to the 
transfer of power from European to African rulers, but also causing a 
change in the nature of authority. With their independence, leaders began 
to change the constitution arbitrarily, ignored the delegation of a higher 
authority and imposed their personal rule in order to stay in office. In the 
cases where rulers placed their will above the constitution, it became 
impossible to remove them by institutional means (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1982: 17). 
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According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 19), personal politics 
creates a system of relations between the rulers, public and clients, patrons 
and rivals. One of the methods that leaders apply in personal politics is a 
type of behavior involving coercion, violence and conspiracy. An 
environment of political insecurity becomes more prevalent, since leaders 
live in a constant fear of plots, coups or successions. As a result of this 
insecure environment, infightings between rulers and factions create a 
vacuum of effective ruling and induce state failure. Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982: 21) also argue that an authoritarian ruler may become an effective as 
well as a successful one and may not necessarily cause deterioration of state 
institutions. When this authoritarian type of regime shifts into a tyrannical 
rule, it weakens the state structure by imposing abusive and unrestrained 
policies.  
Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 77-80) distinguish between four types of 
personal regimes; each designates different patterns of rule. First one is the 
‚princely rule‛ which derives its conception from Machiavellian 
understanding. The prince displays royalist characteristics similar to those 
of a traditional monarchy, where the ruler is the personification of the state 
and guardian of its political values and practices. He tends to rule jointly 
with other oligarchs and is flexible enough to allow politics of 
accommodation. The authors maintain that the majority of Africa’s new 
rulers have exhibited the characteristics and methods of rule of the Prince 
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(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 83). Examples given by the authors are Léopold 
Senghor of Senegal, Jomo Kenyetta of Kenya and William Tubman and 
William Tolbert of Liberia, whose personal rule determined the character of 
the states over which they presided. In ‚autocratic rule‛ leaders use 
centralized power structures. This type of ruler tends to dominate the 
government, the oligarchs and the state without having to share power 
with other leaders. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) gave the examples of 
President Bongo who ruled Gabon and President Banda who ruled Malawi. 
The ‚tyrannical rule‛ exercise power in a completely arbitrary fashion in a 
way that abusive and coercive behaviors can occur. Lastly in ‚prophetic 
rule‛ charismatic personalities reshape society in accordance with their own 
ideologies. These rulers are impatient with the social, economic and 
political conditions about them which they seen as obstacles to socialist 
progress. Jackson and Rosberg consider President Touré of Guinea as a 
prophetic ruler due to his continued emphasis on his socialist doctrines. 
Jackson and Rosberg’s overall point is that personal rule is a distinct 
kind of political model, which operates with its specific characteristics. 
Unlike Zartman and Rotberg, who only briefly touch upon the personal 
rule approach and prefer to explain it with case studies, as will be seen 
below, Jackson and Rosberg present a generic understanding for African 
rulers depicting them as ambitious power-seekers. Accordingly, their 
typology not only explains weak African states according to the personal 
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rule understanding, but also presents an insight into the aberration and 
breakdown in those weak or failing states.  
 
2.3 Zartman and Regime Failure 
 
William Zartman is a professor emeritus of Political Science and author and 
editor of several books studies Africa related subjects. He is currently 
working at Johns Hopkins University as the Director of the Conflict 
Management Program. His works are Political Elites in Arab North Africa 
(1982) as the editor and contributor, Collapsed States: the Disintegration and 
Restoration of Legitimate Authority (1995) as the editor and contributor, A 
Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement (2002), Peacemaking in 
International Conflict Methods and Techniques (2007). In these books he looks 
at the issues of international relations, crisis management, peacekeeping 
and political risk analysis. 
In his edited book entitled as Collapsed States, he considers state 
leaders as partly responsible for state failure. However, he argues that 
rulers are not the only source that is to blame; rather he posits that regime 
can be a significant factor causing failure. Zartman argues (1995: 2) that 
state failure is a condition of deteriorated regimes of second generation over 
established states. In this respect, states collapse, because leaders pursue 
authoritarian rules and tyranny and undermine state structures as a result. 
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However, Zartman (1995: 7) also remarks that while the tyrant’s destruction 
ruins the state and despite the fact that various cases support this claim, this 
is not the ‚whole story‛. Alongside with tyranny, poor performances of the 
state in terms of representation, output efficiency and interest articulation 
are enumerated as the broad causes. He also asserts that regimes deteriorate 
after a passage of time unable to satisfy the demands of the groups within 
the population (Zartman, 1995: 8). Therefore, even if the population is 
content with the regime or tyrant, soon after their needs are unable to 
satisfy which causes the loss of legitimacy toward the ruling party. This 
leads to animosities between different factions and weakens the state 
structure. 
According to Zartman (1995: 10), some characteristics or warning 
signals are revealed before a state collapses. He argues that these are the 
causes of state collapse as taught by African experience. Five factors are 
identified as the trigger of the state collapse. First, leaders pursue only 
defensive politics by keeping their rivals off, manipulating different factions 
and concentrating on strategies of subordination and repression. In this 
way, they keep away challenges and reduce threats, but they also expel the 
political agenda for participation and programs, namely, the elections and 
political platforms. Second, government abstains from making necessary 
but difficult choices. Such behavior prevents taking urgent decisions and 
leaves states amidst a governance crisis. The reason for decisional evasion 
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can either because of institutional incoherence, in which mechanisms of 
government are insufficient to their challenges, or because of political 
flabbiness, in which the leaders or politicians themselves are lacking 
firmness to take such decisions and enduring the situation. Third, power 
that resides at the center begins to diminish because the government no 
longer responds to the needs of the population. Thus, the public withdraws 
their support and the legitimacy of the government abolishes. Also, the 
center began paying particular attention to the ethnic or regional groups. 
Fourth, power devolves to the peripheries because center fights among 
itself. The center is busy to defend itself from local strongmen, thus local 
authorities grab power in the countryside. And finally, incumbent regime 
loses all of its control by leading ethnic or regional groups to dominate 
within the society. This is the ultimate danger sign where law and order is 
constantly broken and police and army units became gangs and bandits. 
According to Zartman (1995: 9), those five leading signs led to the state 
collapse if preventive measures are not taken immediately. He also adds 
that until it is too late, leaders do not focus their attention to the gravity of 
the problem. Therefore, when a state begin to experience these 
characteristics, state collapse somewhat becomes inevitable. 
The example of Uganda illustrates Zartman’s (1995) argument. In the 
case of Uganda, Idi Amin and his military dictatorship governed the 
country for eight years. Amin concentrated all the power in his own hands 
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and tried to prevent the opposition with purges, persecution and 
oppression. His rule was characterized by widespread corruption, 
nepotism, human rights abuses and economic degradation. However, as 
dissent occurred within the population, Amin’s attempts to prevent 
antagonism proved abortive. Amin fled and left the country in state of a 
power vacuum. Not only politically, but also economically the country was 
left weakened. Thus, by the time Amin left the country, state had already 
collapsed entirely. In the midst of Uganda-Tanzanian War, Tanzanian 
forces crossed the border and what they found was a stateless society. As 
Zartman (1995) has pointed out, the nature of the strongman regime and 
performance of the state have been major contributors to the 
failure/collapse of Uganda. 
Although regime failure is seen as the primary cause of state failure, 
state leaders are also found responsible in Zartman’s analysis. He argues 
that despite the differences of tenure and characteristics of governments, in 
the cases of Uganda, Chad and Ghana, there exists an ‚established, but 
poorly functioning regime [which is] replaced by a military regime, that 
concentrated power, but was unable to exercise it effectively or 
legitimately‛ (Zartman, 1995: 3). In Chad, due to a factional civil war 
among guerilla victors over the previous regime, executive, legislative, 
judiciary and bureaucratic branches of the government collapsed in 
between 1980-1982. During the third republic under Hilla Limann in Ghana 
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(1979-1981), the center lost its ability to control government functions and 
lost control over the countryside. As a result, opposition groups became 
more organized than the state and cases of corruption and coercion 
increased. In Uganda, after Idi Amin had concentrated all power in his 
hands, a coalition of oppositions arose and left the country in a power 
vacuum in 1979-1981. 
In the final analysis, Zartman argues (1995: 6) that state collapse was 
not the result of ‚Western-style‛ malfunction in the state or the badly 
adapted Western institutions. He accepts that African parties, parliaments 
and bureaucracies have difficulties in gripping the standards that 
Montesquieu or Weber had set, but insists that those are not the key to 
collapse, nor do these institutions function any better in states that do not 
collapse in Africa. He maintains that state collapse is not a civilizational 
decay or a post-colonial phenomenon, but rather it is the failure of those 
second generation regimes that are ruling over established states. 
 
2.4 Reno, the Shadow State and Patron-Client Based Politics  
 
William Reno is a specialist in African politics and the politics of 
‚collapsing states‛. He is currently teaches at Weinberg College of Arts and 
Science at Northwestern University. His prominent works are ‚Sovereignty 
and Personal Rule in Zaire‛ (1997), Warlord Politics and African States (1998), 
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‚The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States‛ (2002), ‚Congo: From State 
Collapse to ‘Absolutism’, to State Failure‛ (2006). 
In these works he examines the themes such as ethnicity, nationalism, 
commercial organizations, corruption and warlord politics in Africa. 
According to Reno (2002: 837) the main reason that leads to state 
failure is the presence of ‚Shadow State‛ and the patrimonial rule that it 
breeds. With a range of activities, rulers of the ‚Shadow State‛ weaken 
bureaucratic institutions and ensure the enrichment of government elites in 
return. Reno (2000b: 434) defines ‚Shadow State‛ as ‚a form of personal 
rule; that is an authority based upon the decisions and interests of an 
individual, not a set of written laws and procedures, even though these 
formal aspects of government may exist‛. Thus, the phenomenon of 
‚Shadow State‛ is purely the product of personal rule of the leaders. Reno 
(2000b: 434) states that ‚Shadow State‛ is based on rulers’ abilities to 
manipulate external actors’ access to markets, both formal and clandestine, 
by depending on the global recognition of sovereignty by external actors. 
This kind of manipulation provide rulers to enhance their power and 
control access to economic market and resources, but at the same time it 
directly undermines the formal institutions of the government.  
Reno (2000a: 45) argues that a closer examination of the ‚Shadow 
State‛ in Africa illuminates a relationship between economic and political 
organizations. Lack of popular acceptance of regimes in certain countries 
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directs rulers to relinquish support and legitimacy from citizens. Instead, 
they manipulate the accessibility to markets and enhance their own power. 
This creates an informal and clandestine economy where the rulers control 
all the activities of the citizens and use the global recognition of sovereignty 
as an opportunity to make use of personal profits. According to Reno (2002: 
839), corrupt behaviors of rulers derive from the difficulties that are faced 
during the decolonization period. 
Decolonization period during the 1950s and 1960s and subsequent 
border agreements between those states under UN monitoring provided a 
stabile phase for African states. Indeed, this period created what Herbst 
(2000: 97-136) calls ‚a friendly international system‛ causing pacifism 
among rulers and leading them to adopt inefficient and unsuccessful 
policies. According to Reno (2002: 839), with the transition of power from 
colonizers to the independent states, leaders that came to power often 
exhibited a confused state of mind due to their lack of knowledge of how to 
govern. As a result, as soon as they came to power, they faced internal 
challenges despite the external stability. In Sub-Saharan Africa, first 
military coup took place in 1963 and by 2002, military rulers replaced the 
civilian governments in half of Africa’s states. In 1999, Algeria, Angola, 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan 
had major armed conflicts to replace existing regimes. Six of these conflicts 
used national armies and individuals who were once collaborators of the 
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rulers tried to replace them in all of them (Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 
2001: 52-64). During multi-party elections, similar dangers appeared in 
some other African countries. 2002 election in Zimbabwe resulted to 
internal conflict. In Cote d’Ivore, opposition parties boycotted the elections 
and forced out re-elected president in 2000. Similarly 2003 elections of 
Zimbabwe led to a separatist violence in the country. According to Reno, 
the potential dangers encourage leaders to avoid using centralized military 
command structures. By manipulating factional conflicts within militaries, 
leaders keep their rivals weak and unthreatening. They implement 
personalized policies and authoritative measures in their domestic policies. 
However, such policies led to disunion within the populace. Leaders found 
themselves facing with societies that include diverse factions who are 
uncompromising with each other.  
A common strategy [that is applied] during the Cold War [is to 
articulate a vague sense of nationalism towards this fractioned 
society] usually found expression in domestic policies of economic 
self-sufficiency and externally in the diplomacy of non-alignment 
(Reno, 2002: 839). 
 
However, this often becomes a futile attempt due to the lack of state 
support for policies. According to Reno, a second strategy that is applied by 
rulers is to provide accommodation of different parties by closing informal 
deals with the groups and buying loyalties. In order to enhance their own 
power, rulers distribute state assets. While this provides some short-term 
security benefits for the ruler, in the long term, they endanger themselves 
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by paying too little attention to the needs of the population. The issue of 
state failure or state collapse and its link with ‚Shadow State‛ becomes 
apparent at this point. 
As leaders irresponsibly distribute state resources to their loyal 
counterparts, expenditures on the public services decrease and discontent 
in the society increases. Gradually, these illegal, commercial networks turn 
into predatory and corrupt regimes. In such situations, rulers who want to 
pursue reforms based on economic and political liberalization however 
cannot carry them out because they encounter ‚weak-state rulers’ 
dilemma‛ (Reno, 1998: 5).  In this corrupt network, rulers want to 
implement reforms in order to provide economic growth and maximize 
their power, but since the same opportunities may become available to the 
local strongmen whose interests may oppose to the rulers, they cannot 
implement reforms. In other words, rulers’ fear that these strongmen may 
acquire interests and powers are at odds with their efforts to retain power. 
Furthermore, rulers cannot mobilize popular support against local 
strongmen from within the population because of the loss of legitimacy 
long before. 
Reno (2006) tests his hypothesis on the case of Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) (Zaire from 1967 to 1997), which, he argues, shows the 
signs of institutional state collapse. When the country gained independence 
from Belgium in 1960, it was viewed as the world’s first failed state as the 
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public order broke down and secessionist violence occurred. The Belgian 
soldiers that lent aid to secessionist administration were prevented and 
thereby the mutiny got under control. But, the real collapse happened in the 
1980s as a result of the policies of Mobutu and his associates. Zaire 
flourished in the mid-1960s and 1970s with rapid modernization reforms 
conducted by President Mobutu Sese Sako (Reno, 2006: 43). By the 1980s, 
corruption and state decline occurred in the same state and consequently, in 
1990s state collapse arose in DRC. Reno questions the failure of 
modernization attempts, and the effect of patronage-based politics in state 
collapse. He argues that rather than a corrupt despot, Mobutu seemed 
much like the other modernizers such as Nasser and Reza Shah (Reno 2006: 
44). However, promises of rapid development was not kept during the 
same period, local organizations prevailed over state authority due to the 
loss of structural capacity to deliver goods. Patronage based politics was 
present during the modernization period. However, rather than the cause 
of economic failure, it seemed as compatible with the economic growth. 
But, Mobutu began to emphasize maintaining personal power in 1970s. 
From the perspective of economy and human rights his leadership was 
unsuccessful: economic growth is slowed down and some of the ministers 
were banished. Corruption through informal and personal connections 
become an essential part of the whole system of planned economy and at 
the cost of abandoning economic growth, Mobutu’s own strategy of rule 
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emphasized career and social aspiration of himself and his nearbies. As a 
result, the country caught between various forces that pursue violent 
strategies to keep local support. 
In short, Reno (2006) argues that African leaders have chosen to 
undermine their own governments in order to hold on to political power. 
Legacies of the colonial rule were obviously important in this analysis, 
however the structure of power relations and the nature of resources play a 
more essential role. Also, while weak-state rulers’ dilemma poses 
challenges to the state leader and state itself, it also weakens the already 
precarious states and leads them to fail in the long run. Reno’s analysis also 
indicates that rulers have a central interest to stay in power. Therefore, they 
render their citizens’ life less secure and more impoverished, expecting that 
citizens eventually seek the help of the rulers for the termination of these 
conditions. However, as the regime loses its legitimacy, people’s loyalty to 
the state leader also decreases.  
 
2.5 Rotberg and Misrule as the Reason of State Failure  
 
Robert I. Rotberg who was the president of World Peace Foundation, is the 
author and editor of several books and articles on intrastate conflict, 
peacekeeping and state failure. His well-known works are State Failure and 
State Weakness in a Time of Terror (2003) as the editor and contributor, When 
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States Fail: Causes and Consequences (2004) as the editor and contributor, 
‚Renewing Good Leadership: Overcoming the Scourges of Africa‛ (2006). 
These works mostly focus on failed or weak states situated in Africa and 
discuss the aspects of leadership, governance, political stability and 
economic growth. His works about state weakness and failure are referred 
frequently in the state failure literature. 
Rotberg makes a performance-based analysis in his article ‚New 
Nature of Nation-State Failure‛. He posits that nation-states exist to deliver 
basic public goods such as security, health services, education, order and 
economic opportunity to people living within a designated territory 
(Rotberg, 2002: 87). However, when they can no longer deliver these public 
goods to their citizens, they gradually lose control over and legitimacy of 
people. In this regard, nation-states are seen by Rotberg as the sole 
responsible to maximize the well-being and prosperity of people.  
According to Rotberg, a failed state is a state that is no longer able to 
perform the job of a nation-state in the modern world. At this point, 
Rotberg makes a distinction between ‚strong‛ and ‚weak‛ state. The 
difference between strong and weak states is based on the performances of 
the states (Rotberg, 2004: 2). Accordingly, states can be categorized as 
strong or weak based on their economic success, stability of institutions or 
infrastructures, but level of effective delivery of the most crucial political 
goods distinguishes strong states from weak states and weak states from 
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collapsed states. On top of the political goods, supplying security exists as 
the most critical one. Traditionally, a state’s prime function is seen as to 
provide security by preventing loss of territories, cross-border invasions 
and eliminate domestic threats to national order (Rotberg, 2004: 3). The 
other desirable public goods such as rule of law, security of property and 
inviolable contracts, a judicial system, medical and educational services 
become only possible, provided that exists a proper measure of security. In 
Rotberg’s analysis, these political goods set the criteria of strong, weak or 
failed in which modern nation-states may be judged. Strong states show 
noticeably a higher level of performance by controlling their territories and 
deliver a high quality of political goods, while weak states show an 
unsteady performance by acting poorly in some areas and performing well 
in other areas, but a broader crisis where signs of deterioration in economy 
and politics stands out. In this categorization, failed or failing states are 
designated as the subcategory of weakness; where the state’s performance 
is poor enough to flunk in all of the categories.  
According to this performance-based analysis, Rotberg (2002: 85) 
contends, ‚state failure is man-made‛. It is neither an accidental 
phenomenon nor caused by geography or environment. The apparent 
reason behind performance failure caused mainly by corrupt leaders.  
Rotberg (2004) argues a leader’s corrupt regulations and decisions bring 
these weak states in the cusp of failure. In fact, Rotberg’s argument goes 
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parallel with some other scholars in the literature who have also argued 
that leaders and rulers are responsible for leading a state into weakness 
(Zartman, 1995; Van de Walle; 2004, Reno, 1997). According to Rotberg 
(2002), following their succession to power, the ‚kleptocratic rule‛ of the 
elites has led to failure of their states. In his conception, after the ruling elite 
came to power, concerns of staying in office replaces considering the 
expectations of the citizens. State leaders focus on gaining short-term 
advantages, resources began to be distributed unevenly, where all the 
money goes into leader’s pocket and as a result, widespread corruption 
begins. In some other cases, leaders have to fight with different groupings 
as soon as they hold power. By giving privileges to one group while 
neglecting rest of the citizens, they cause resentments within the 
population, decreasing loyalties to the leadership. Citizens transfer their 
allegiances to some group leaders or clans in order to achieve security or 
economic benefits. Hence, prevalence of the military regime or some ethnic 
groups is encountered in failed states.  
Rotberg uses the example of Zimbabwe as a case study. According to 
Rotberg (2004: 23), President Mugabe brought the country in the brink of 
failure under his corrupt rule. After Zimbabwe gained its independence in 
1980, Mugabe’s Patriotic Front won the elections. Mugabe discouraged 
domestic and international investment, weakened the courts, damaged 
local commerce, restricted the press and brought the country to the edge of 
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starvation in 2002. However, rather than trying to provide food to people, 
the leaders of Zimbabwe manipulated the country’s food storage to punish 
political opponents and divisions in the government. Furthermore, 
international food aid was banned and only the government controlled 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB) was allowed to distribute food. 
Consequently, it was realized that GMB had insufficient stocks of foods and 
made a discriminatory distribution. Health and educational services has 
decreased rapidly. GDP per capita decreased 10 percent by each year, and 
inflation has risen from 30 percent to 116 percent during the same period.  
According to Rotberg (2004: 23), Zimbabwe’s situation can be 
explained by the human agency. Human factor caused a shift from strength 
to weakness and resource transfer from state to the ruling few. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, President Robert G. Mugabe, in Sri Lanka Solomon and 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, in Afghanistan Gulbuddin Hakmatyar and 
Burrhan ul-din Rabani personally drove their country to the brink of 
collapse. Institutional weakness and structural flaws contributed to the 
failure, however these reasons are also closely related to the human agency. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked at the literature that analyzes reasons of state failure 
based on the leadership approach. The authors argue that with their 
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mismanagement or flawed decisions, state leaders have had an important 
effect on state decay. 
According to Rotberg, a nation-state fails when it is unable to deliver 
positive public goods to its citizens. Several indicators points to state failure 
such as growth of criminal violence and corruption, flawed institutions, 
deteriorating infrastructures or declining real national and per capita levels. 
However, what brings states to this point to the human agency, namely, 
leadership decisions and policies. In fact, the leadership fault figures such 
as Samuel Doe in Liberia, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Siad Barre in Somalia, 
Felix Hauphouet Boigny in Ivory Coast, Idi Amin in Uganda and Siakka 
Stevens in Sierra Leone proved that their policies weaken the state 
institutions and even bring these states in the precipice of failure and 
collapse. 
William Zartman makes a similar argument to Rotberg. But, he also 
argues that in addition to leadership mismanagement, regime failure 
influences states more profoundly by bringing states to the cusp of failure. 
Regimes are unable to exert their power over citizens after the passage of 
time. This is derived from the lack of experience of the second-generation 
regimes. The newcoming leaders have pursued authoritative policies by 
causing state structure to deteriorate. As a result, leaders lost control over 
citizens and left the state in a power vacuum where different groups vie for 
power. 
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Different from Rotberg and Zartman, Reno focuses on state leaders, 
but investigates the problem from a different perspective. He thinks that 
leaders do not undermine their own authorities intentionally. He argues 
that the reason why they apply insufficient or unsuccessful policies is their 
lack of knowledge and internal challenges that they face. Even if a state 
becomes externally safe, due to the presence of opposition groups, local 
strongmen or clans, state leaders resort to methods such as buying loyalties 
or balancing the interests of different groups for the sake of consolidating 
their power. 
Jackson and Rosberg create a model from the state failure concept. In 
this model, they highlight important features of African politics such as 
clientelism and patronage, coups, purges, plots, succession crises. 
According to them, it has been in large part the maintenance of personal 
political skills and acumen of individual rulers that has determined the 
relative stability of the regimes. In addition to this, style of rule of the 
regimes depended on the personal dispositions of individual rulers. 
However, they argue that despite different styles of rule, different personal 
characteristics, belief sets or backgrounds; incumbent leaders actually 
follow a similar path when they first came to power. Due to the possibility 
of overthrown, they develop relations not with the public or with the ruled, 
but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals. Although 
Jackson and Rosberg try to concretize the approach by presenting a model, 
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their model also includes elements of psychology. The behaviors and the 
motives of the leaders in different situations are often explained in detail.  
Therefore, their model consists of both sociological and psychological 
factors in explaining the state weakness. 
This chapter introduced leadership-based approach that prevails in 
the literature. A leadership or regime failure based approach explains 
‚failed states‛ with reference to individual level factors. It explains the 
degeneration in states by depicting leaders as power pursuers. In the 
following chapter, the literature that focuses on colonial legacy and the 
post-colonial statehood will be looked at. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
COLONIAL LEGACY AND POST-COLONIAL STATEHOOD 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Scholars who were considered at in the first chapter elaborated on the role of 
state leaders, regarding them as arbitrary figureheads or unsuccessful 
managers of the state. Indeed, inconsistent policies and decisions of the 
leaders usually weaken the state structure by creating patronage-based 
networks. However, another group of scholars have argued that the root of 
the problem is not personal but historical, emanating from the legacy of 
colonialism. Dominance of the imperial rule, especially the European 
colonialism between 1914 and 1945 and the imposition of the European 
model nation-state to the post-colonial states are seen by these scholars as the 
root causes of the failure. In particular, state formation processes, territorial 
border settlements in the subsequent independence period, and the legacies 
of the end of the Cold War are highlighted to indicate that there exists a 
bigger picture as to why some states are failing, while some others are not. 
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Although state failure is encountered in any region of the world, Africa is 
taken as the empirical basis in most of this literature. 
This chapter is to going to present an analysis of the phenomenon of 
state failure through a historical perspective as introduced by a group of 
authors (Alao, 1999; Clapham, 2001; Herbst, 2004; Mayall, 2005). Charles 
Abiodun Alao (1999) argues that the reason of the state failure is the peculiar 
characteristic of the state system which is created with colonialism. 
Christopher S. Clapham (1996) presents that factors such as boundary 
demarcation and national identity are important in state breakdown. James 
Mayall (2005) argues that colonial legacy is the only element that is the root 
cause of state failure. Jeffrey Herbst (1996, 2000, 2004) focuses on European 
model of nation-state and argues that this model is not suitable for the states 
in Africa. Herbts’ analysis is the most comprehensive one in terms of 
including the factors such as boundaries, population density, lack of 
institutions and land characteristics. 
 
3.2 Alao and Historically Weak State Structure 
 
C. Abiodun Alao is a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict Security and 
Development Group (CSDG) and African Leadership Centre (ALC). He has 
undertaken extensive consultancy works for the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the United 
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Nations (UN). His research interests consist of the politics of natural resource 
conflicts, rebellion and civil wars, and African security. Some of his 
published works consist of Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives 
on Security (1998) as the editor, ‚The Problem of the Failed State in Africa‛ 
(1999), Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment 
(2007), Mugabe and the Politics and Diplomacy of Security in Zimbabwe (2011). 
Alao presents his argument by indicating that most of the states that 
have recently collapsed situated in Africa. He acknowledges the historically 
weak structures of the African states and remarks that this weak structure is 
further weakened by colonialism and activities of the élite class that seize 
power after independence. According to Alao (1999: 84), ‚Africa has always 
been at the receiving end of the global *developments+‛. Throughout history, 
it had to deal with successive plundering, slave trade, exploitation by 
colonialism and neocolonialism. During the independence period, UN 
granted sovereignty to the African states and they became members of the 
international community without taking part in the creation of it.  
Frequency of the failures in the post-1990 led to the questioning of 
whether the shifts or the policies of the two superpowers led to the state 
failure. According to Alao, although the incidences of state failure have 
gained momentum with the end of the Cold War, the phenomenon was not 
entirely created by it, but rather the issue dates back to the pre-Cold War 
period. Alao follows Zartman’s (1995: 3) ‚two waves of collapse‛ argument. 
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According to that, the first wave of collapsed states occurred towards the end 
of the second decade of independence. This wave overthrew the original 
nationalist regimes and created a power-vacuum. Following this, a second 
round appeared beginning from 1980s and has continued into the 1990s. 
Alao concentrates on the second wave in his study because as he argues the 
implications of the second wave could spread into the coming century and 
also because most of the states affected by the first wave have already been 
on the path of recovery. 
According to Alao (1999: 84), roots of the state failure in Africa arise 
from the ‚peculiar‛ characteristics of the state system, which is created 
through colonialism. Four interconnected features constitute these peculiar 
characteristics of the state system in Africa and are the reasons of state failure 
according to Alao. At the roots of the most recent crisis of state failure in 
Africa is the process of state formation. With the process of state formation, 
argue Alao, people with different political, ethnic and religious affiliations 
assembled together by colonialism to form states. Notwithstanding their 
diverse affiliations and non-existence of their common bonds, former 
colonial powers created their own proxy states in which African states did 
not taken any role. Therefore, after decolonization, plenty of independent 
states with no common historical memory or experience are occurred. 
 Secondly, as a result of decolonization, an artificial nature of 
boundaries is established and thus individual ethnic groups are divided 
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between two or more nations. The result was not only the boundary 
problems between neighboring countries, but was also the reunification 
attempts and self-determination of partitioned ethnic groups. Alao (1999: 94) 
argues that while the African countries realized that these boundaries will 
constitute a problem in the future, they had to comply what is imposed due 
to their fear of the repetition of events that was experienced during the 
bloody partition of the South Asia in 1947.  
A third characteristic is rooted in the weak nature of economy that 
African countries inherited at their independence. African economy’s 
incorporation into the capitalist framework created structural deficiencies 
and crises by weakening the state foundation to cope with internal 
challenges. As a result, economies became structurally weak to withstand the 
challenges of nation-building. 
As a final characteristic, the nature of the élites and their desire to stay 
in power through suppression, corruption, exploitation is propounded as an 
element of failure as it was explained in detail in Chapter 1. Alao (1999: 85) 
argues that the role of the élites, some of whom emerged as warlords in 
collapsed states, is not a mere coincidence. Elites played important political, 
economic or military roles in the affairs of their respective countries before 
the collapse. 
In the post-Cold War period, number of state collapses increased. Alao 
(1999: 86) argues that ‚Cold War created legacies which shook the 
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foundation of many governments, at those which could not stand the 
pressure ultimately collapsed‛. According to Alao, there are interrelated 
causes of state failure in the post-Cold War period including the weakness of 
the inherited state structure and difficulties coping with the post-Cold War 
transition, radical rise of ethno-nationalism and descending economic 
fortune of most African states. The inability to establish viable institutional 
structures resulted weak democratic traditions in African countries. Either 
military regimes or one party system was operational. Also, democratic 
values and accountability of public officers were absent in most countries. 
Root of the problem also emanate from the rise of ethno-nationalism. Despite 
the ongoing debate as to whether the rise in ethnic nationalism is a cause or 
consequence of state collapse, Alao (1999: 88) contends that it could act both 
as a cause and as a consequence according to the experiences in Africa. 
Alao’s Liberia example supports his argument. In Liberia, oppressive 
leadership of President Samuel Doe led to ethnic division, which in turn 
brought the oppressed sections of the country together to challenge the 
central government and eventually resulted in the disintegration of the 
country. Another cause of state failure was the rise of poverty level, which 
deepened with a debt of US$135 billion at February 1996. Imposed Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAP) on countries as a means of solving their budget 
problem and introduction of the same structural package to all weak states 
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caused a negative impact on the African continent, which will be looked at in 
Chapter 3.  
Alao uses Liberia and Somalia as case studies in his article. According 
to Alao, Somalia collapsed due to a number of factors. First reason was the 
decline of external patronage, which sustained the repressive and corrupt 
regime of Siad Barre. The second reason was the largely man-made famine 
that ravaged the country. Third reason was the country’s defeat in the 
Ogaden War against Ethiopia. And final reason was because of the domestic 
opposition to the government’s internal repression. By 1991, the government 
of Siad Barre had collapsed. The competition to fill the vacuum resulted in a 
breakdown of order and law and emergence of two warlords: Mohamed 
Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi who tore the country apart. The situation 
deteriorated gradually insomuch that the relief materials could not reach to 
the starving population requiring the eventual concern of the international 
community.  
In Liberia case, Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia to challenge the oppressive regime of the President Samuel Doe in 
1989. An abortive coup by Gio/Mano ethnic group is organized against Doe 
who was from Krahn ethnic group. Later, Gio/Mano ethnic group who 
suffered massive persecution under government of Doe took the control and 
government collapsed within the weeks. After massacres began, a 
peacekeeping mission by Economic Community of West African States’ 
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monitoring group (ECOMOG) forces was initiated. 14 unsuccessful peace 
agreements have signed until an accord between the warring factions.  
As a whole, Alao points out that interrelated factors and 
characteristics that are only specific to Africa are the causes of the multiple 
state failures and collapses in this continent. Those factors can be divided 
into two groups: pre-Cold War elements that started with the colonialism 
and caused first wave of collapses and additional post-Cold War elements 
that resulted second wave of collapses. In this regard, Alao’s analysis 
includes the nature of élites, economic poverty, rise of ethno-nationalism and 
weak state structure. Additionally, he asserts that colonial legacies such as 
artificial boundaries, nature of economies and lack of common bonds 
between peoples as a result of state formation are also the causes of the 
phenomenon. Process of state formation however, is seen as the root cause of 
the problem. 
  
3.3 Clapham and Demarcation of Boundaries  
 
Christopher Clapham is an associate of the Centre for African Studies at 
Cambridge University and president of the African Studies Association of 
the United Kingdom. He specializes in African politics and international 
relations. Some of his works include Africa and the International System (1996), 
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African Guerillas (1998), ‚Discerning the New Africa‛ (1998), ‚Rethinking 
African States‛ (2001). 
Clapham investigates the current situation of African states by 
focusing on the concepts of state building, national identity and demarcation 
of boundaries. He argues that Western European colonialism has totally 
transformed the map of Africa by partitioning the region into a collection of 
territories without considering the national identities (Clapham, 1996: 30). 
In his study entitled as ‚Rethinking of African States‛ (2001), Clapham 
compares Africa and Europe and discusses the paradoxical contrast between 
them. He notes that considering the total transformation of borders in 
Europe, the map of Africa didn’t undergo a substantial change as the 
boundaries are still pretty much the same today (Clapham, 2001: 6). Clapham 
explores the reasons of the weak and artificial states in Africa by focusing on 
the statehood and territoriality in Africa and Europe. He argues that 
‚European states exist in order to express the identity of the groups of people 
who inhabit them‛ (Clapham, 2001: 8). According to this, the community 
defines the state and the boundaries are drawn in order to reflect the extent 
of this community. The main element of European statehood since the 
German and Italian unification was to reflect ‚national identities‛ by 
redrawing boundaries. If this condition is not met, evident tensions arise as 
the case in Basque province of Spain, Belgium and Northern Ireland. In 
Africa, situation has been very different. Unlike Europe, boundaries came 
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first in Africa and states have been formed within them. Most of the states 
are directly the descendants of the colonial partition. Although this brought 
formal government structures and clearly demarcated borders between 
states, these boundaries are usually designated without regarding the 
cultural, ethnic or historical identities of the people (Clapham, 1996: 30). 
Within the territories, administrative hierarchies were established 
from the newly formed colonial capitals to the capitals in Europe. Africans 
only took subordinate or lower positions at the local level. In addition to this, 
colonizers, to a large extent, ‚simply established the kind of territorial 
structure which they assumed < necessary and indispensable element of 
government‛ as Clapham (1996: 31) argues. The boundaries that are 
demarcated were essential in order to regulate competition between 
themselves. An important consequence of colonialism for Africa was that it 
not only divide the continent into state-like territories, but did it with the 
support of eight different colonial powers which caused the emergence of 
three main language –French, English, Portuguese- rule in the continent. This 
situation divided Africa into linguistic and cultural blocs and intensified the 
emergence of factions. 
According to Clapham (2001: 9), due to the arbitrarily imposed 
boundaries, their maintenance has become the central concern for the 
succeeding ruling elite. Some states expressed their desire for more unity 
within the continent soon after the independence. Under the signatory of 32 
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governments, Organization of African Unity (OAU)3 is established in order 
to promote unity and solidarity, and to intensify the cooperation of African 
states. But, ‚rather than promoting ‘unity’ indicated by its name, [it] was 
actually designed to reinforce sovereignty of the individual states, and secure 
the peaceful regulation of their relations with one another‛ (Clapham, 1998: 
263). The superpowers had a little interest towards those states and were 
content that they maintained their existing state structure. Thus, the 
international environment was generally secure for the African states 
(Clapham, 1998: 263). They did not feel threatened by outside powers and 
this situation made them indifferent to any kind of development. 
Like Alao, Clapham points out that the emergence of weak and failed 
states in Africa emanate from the way these states are formed. Boundaries of 
the countries are not drawn according to the national identities of the people, 
but rather imposed borders are drawn by the colonizers. An external hand 
decided everything for African states without consent. Clapham’s analysis is 
similar to Alao’s in the sense that he also emphasizes colonial legacies of the 
African states as the causes of state failure. The difference is that while Alao 
focus on historical, social, political and economic factors, Clapham only 
discusses historical and social side without considering the economic 
reasons. Additionally, the focus of the two authors differs. Clapham mainly 
                                                          
3 OAU was disbanded on 9 July 2002 and replaced by African Union (AU). 
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focus on boundary demarcation and national identity issues, while Alao 
centers his attention to state structure. 
 
3.4 Mayall and Territorial Settlements  
 
James Mayall is an academic and Emeritus Professor of International 
Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is 
currently working as a Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies in the University of London’s School of Advanced 
Studies. Mayall’s research interest includes international relations of African 
states, North-South relations, world order after Cold War, international 
theory, and impact of nationalism on international relations. Amongst his 
publications are Nationalism and International Society (1990), The Fallacies of 
Hope: The Post-Colonial Record of the Commonwealth Third World, with Anthony 
Payne (1991) and World Politics: Progress and its Limits (2000). 
Mayall (2005: 38) argues that it is not the transfer of power or the 
personalities in the regime that is the root cause of state failure. He contends 
that the causes of the contemporary state failure can only be understood by 
considering the contribution of colonial legacy. Put in broader terms, Mayall 
argues that the concept of state is also a colonial import, therefore modern 
notion of statehood and its principles such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and 
territorial integrity should be understood as Western creations. Instead of 
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culturally specific concept, sovereignty is taken for granted as a 
universalized concept that indicated same features all around the world 
(Mayall, 2005: 37). Because of this understanding, Mayall maintains that 
European state model do not function in the same way in all nation-states. 
Where the state is not able to adapt its own values to the imposition or 
transform itself, states fail to function or collapse. 
Mayall (2005: 41) states that the territorial aspect of the colonial legacy 
is a contributor to state failure. During the transfer of power between 1947 
and 1960s, the United Nations offered a blueprint for African states. Before 
colonization, borders used to change either as a result of a battle or with the 
commercial exchanges. Under European colonial rule, despite the territorial 
scramble, little change of boundaries had occurred because colonizing states 
feared that this might destabilize their relations. Therefore, pragmatic 
solutions were almost always sought, such as the decision of effective control 
that was taken in the 1884 Congress of Berlin.4 By introducing this principle 
and with the UN demarcation of boundaries, imperial powers controlled the 
territories as they wish and recreated a new political map of Africa. 
Demarcations often determined without having a closer look of the habitants, 
                                                          
4 The Berlin Conference was called for by Portugal and organized by Germany in order to 
regulate European colonization and trade in Africa. The conference took place in a period 
where colonial activities had peaked. According to the decision of effectiveness, colonial 
powers could hold their colonies only if they actually possessed them. In other words, they 
can possess colonies if they had treaties with local leaders or if they flew their flag in there 
for instance. 
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ethnic elements or multilayered identities. These territorial aspects that come 
from colonial times led to hurdles for future development and instability. 
Mayall (2005: 37) argues that after decolonization, Europeans did not 
simply disappear. In other words the legacy of Europeans continued in the 
African continent. They remained influential and powerful by occupying 
permanent seats on the Security Council as Britain and France did. However, 
the state that is foreseen by the colonizers and the state that actualize in 
Africa did not overlap at all. Another legacy of the colonial state was the 
policies of developmental nationalism. These were adopted in the final years 
of the colonial rule in an attempt to break with the colonial past. However, 
African governments were unable to bring the transformation which they 
aspired because it had colonial roots in it. 
In general, Mayall’s perspective looks at four colonial legacies as 
causes of the state failure. Anti-colonial nationalism, territorial settlements, 
role of economic developments and the role of social structure and political 
developments are explained. According to Mayall, in order to understand 
the problem of contemporary state failure, it is necessary to understand the 
contribution of colonial legacy. His main point is that European state and 
state-system had different consequences, for good and ill, in different parts of 
the world, but for Africa there is the ill consequence. 
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3.5 Herbst and Imposition of European Model of Nation-State 
 
Jeffrey Herbst is the author of several books and articles including his 
prominent and award-winner book States and Power in Africa (2000). He also 
wrote several articles about state failure including ‚The Creation and 
Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa‛ (1989), ‚War and the State in 
Africa‛ (1990), ‚Responding to State Failure in Africa‛ (1996/97), Africa and 
the International System (1996), ‚Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and 
Practice‛ (2004). His research interests include politics of state failure and 
consolidation, political and economic liberalization and peacekeeping in 
African continent. He has been a professor of political science in Miami and 
Princeton University. Since 2010, he has been president of Colgate 
University. 
In his article ‚Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice‛, 
Herbst analyzes the problem of state failure in Africa and proposes policy 
responses for the issue. According to Herbst (2004: 302), there has been a 
stabilized state system from World War II to the early 1990s. Except a few 
forcible boundary changes such as the creation of Bangladesh and 
annexation of Golan Heights, boundaries remained stable. However, 
significant number of states has failed or weakened subsequently. Herbst 
(2000) defines state as the main provider of certain public goods such as law, 
defense, order and infrastructure in society. However, in Africa few states 
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can exercise control over their territory, provide order or public goods and 
described as failing or weak states as a result.  Herbst’s basic thesis about the 
reason of failure is related to European colonialism, but factors such as 
population density, land, boundaries, lack of institutions also play a role. 
Herbst (1996: 127) states that the imposition of the ‚territorial nation-
state‛ by Europeans eradicated existing African political practices. Colonial 
rule of the Europeans brought fundamental changes by destroying pre-
colonial practices, especially, the sovereignty. Depicting the difference 
between old and new conceptions of sovereignty, he argues that there are 
two main differences between pre-colonial sovereignty and the sovereignty 
that is exercised in modern Africa. The first difference is that in pre-colonial 
Africa power is exercised over people rather than land (Herbst, 1996: 127). 
Instead of nation-states, there were city states, larger empires and religiously 
based units in the pre-colonial environment where according to Herbst (1996: 
128) exercising political control mainly meant control over people. Due to the 
low density of the population and the vast pieces of land, exercising political 
control was much easier compared to the post-independent states. However, 
in post-colonial Africa the opposite view takes place whereby states are seen 
as ‚territorial entities‛ implementing control over territories.  
Second aspect that is presented by Herbst is that sovereignty was 
inclined to be shared in pre-colonial political practices; therefore belonging to 
one authority or allegiances to one figurehead was not common. On the other 
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hand, in post-colonial states sovereignty is centralized where there is a 
single, uncontested one. These two different aspects of sovereignty between 
the pre-colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, explain the reason why 
African states are instable, weak or unsuccessful to provide basic public 
goods. Demarcation of borders after their initial independence, imposition of 
European model of sovereignty and the creation of territorial states caused a 
severe disruption for African political culture. Hence, the idea that Africa is 
composed of sovereign states that have a control over in territory within their 
boundaries is not true as Herbst (1996: 122) argues.  
In addition to these points, Herbst (2004: 303) states that although 
Africa is plagued by state failure, the phenomenon of state failure is not a 
novel concept. In fact, states in Europe experience failure since 1500. 
However, in terms of the process of state formation there is a huge difference 
between Europe and Africa.  Herbst emphasizes on this difference and made 
his assessment based on the work of Charles Tilly. By referring to Tilly’s 
study about European state-making, Herbst reviews the historical and 
current patterns of the state failure. Tilly (1975: 38) states that majority of the 
states in Europe after 1500 failed and the ones that survived during the 19th 
century failed to operate effectively regardless of the criterion that is 
employed. A peasantry way of life was embraced by the European state-
makers in 1500. Within this peasant world, there were also a populous group 
of landlords and bourgeoisie, claiming their rights over land. High 
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population density in Europe rendered the land relatively scarce and made it 
a valuable asset to control. Cities began to grow as centers of trade, 
communication, administration and manufacturing, additionally 
technological developments such as firearms, gunpowder, artilleries changed 
the methods of warfare. Tilly (1975: 20) noted that those set of social 
arrangements and changes affected the emergence of states. First, Europe as 
it seemed had a great deal of wealth and productive capacity, but those are 
tied strongly to the individuals and local groups. Secondly, military 
innovations made wars extremely expensive by resulting that only states 
with sufficient amount of capital and a large population could afford paying 
for their security and ultimately survive in the hostile environment. 
Institutions of the modern state such as taxes were created to allow 
warmaking. However, lack of resources of the early modern states 
engendered Kings to fight against lords and commoners over taxes and 
created a web in which kings establish bureaucracies to gather information. 
This predatory environment was necessary for states to survive.  
According to Tilly (1975: 27), European nation-state after 1500 was ‚a 
well-defined, continuous territory, relatively centralized, differentiated from 
other organizations and reinforced its claims through physical coercion over 
its territory‛. A centralized state apparatus was created in Europe because 
continuous competition for trade and territory among states made war a 
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driving force in European history (Tilly, 1990: 54). According to Tilly, this 
process created the modern system of nation-states in Europe.  
Herbst’s (2000) argument indicates that the same process of 
centralized state apparatus is established by European colonizers in Africa 
but did not function in the same way. Herbst deduces that Africa is different 
because the structural conditions that led to the formation of state and 
institutions were absent in here. Firstly, land is not scarce as in the case of 
Europe, but labor is. Thus, in the pre-colonial period, states did not fight over 
land, but rather over people. In addition to this, land lost its importance since 
1900 as empires with vast lands have all failed, leading the emergence of a 
large number of smaller states. As a result, number of sovereign states has 
increased from roughly 55 to 192 today. The most successful economies are 
described as the ones, which possess small land and bereft of natural 
resources. Herbst (2004: 304) posits that the land and what is underneath is 
gradually losing its value. Therefore, the direction of state failure is in favor 
of smaller units. He illustrates his point by giving the examples of Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan. Accordingly, despite their little land and deprivation of 
natural resources, these countries have the most successful economies 
outside of Europe since World War II. In addition to that, being rich does not 
depend on mining a vast hinterland, rather possessing advanced 
manufacturing and service sectors. Therefore, as Herbst (2004: 305) states 
that being small is attractive and adds that even ‚states that can be easily 
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conquered are no longer in danger because what they have is not worth 
fighting over‛.  
Following the emergence of the newly independent states, African 
states face problems in several ways. They lack skilled labor, capital and idea 
of nationality (Herbst, 1990: 125). Although other developing nations also 
have similar problems, this is often more extreme in the African continent. 
Since leadership and succession are not institutionalized, elites who came to 
power often faced insecurities. The fear of losing power and displacing by 
another, the probability of exogenous economic shocks and the existence of 
minority groups caused them to desperately control the major parts of the 
society through regulations. Another problem that is faced by the African 
countries is the absence of the popular identity within state (Herbst, 1990: 
127). Despite the twenty-five year of nationalist period, majority of states has 
difficulty in creating viable symbols to attract the loyalties of the citizens. 
Lacks of a national consensus on major issues exacerbate the authoritarian 
regime. This statement indicates that threat of failure sometimes comes from 
within, instead of outside forces.  
Overall, Herbst’s perspective about state failure indicates that colonial 
legacies have played a big role in the weakening of state in Africa. In this 
regard, he makes a similar argument to Alao, Clapham and Mayall. 
However, he also argues that European model of the state is simply the unfit 
institution for Africa because process of state formation, the values of the 
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people and the land are entirely different for two continents. Therefore, 
problem of state failure in Africa does not just emanate from Africa’s 
inability to adapt its values and structures to the European counterpart. 
Rather, it originates from the misconception that European model of state is 
suitable for Africa. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, writings of four authors in the literature are examined. 
Generally, they all argue that the current crisis in the nature of state 
emanates from European colonialism. However their perspectives 
differentiate at some points.  
In the first part, Alao looked at the process of state formation in Africa 
and argued that this continent has some specific characteristics. For instance, 
the nature of economies, nature of élites, ethnic affiliations and boundary 
demarcations are all peculiar to this continent. He argued that states are 
failing or collapsing due to a number of interrelated factors such as legacy of 
historically weak state structure, Cold War transition and the policies that 
were adopted by superpowers during this period, economic difficulties of 
the newly independent states and the rise of ethno nationalism led by the 
demarcation of the borders. His analysis differs from other authors as he 
includes the rise of ethno-nationalism as a cause of the state failure rather 
than a consequence. 
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Clapham, in turn, compared state structure between Africa and 
Europe and showed differences between them. The differentiating point of 
his argument is the focus of territoriality and national identity issue in the 
creation of states. Alao also touched upon the nationalism issue, but 
Clapham highlighted the national identity and community’s role in the 
creation of states. 
In the third part, Mayall argued that the problem of contemporary 
state failure could only be understood through the lens of the legacy of 
colonialism. Therefore, he posited that European agenda and policies during 
this period should be analyzed. In order to unravel the puzzle of state failure, 
he considered four aspects of the colonial legacy. Some of these aspects are 
the differentiating point of Mayall from the other authors. Along with the 
anti-colonial nationalism and territorial settlement, he also explained the 
political role of economic development, which is not dealt by other scholars. 
Herbst looked at the number of different factors in the last section. He 
made the most inclusive analysis among those four authors. Like Clapham, 
he first argued that state formation in Africa did not take place like in 
Europe. After that, he stated that imposition of the ‚territorial nation state‛ 
by Europe eradicated the African political practices by rendering states 
passive and neutral organs. And thirdly, he maintained that post World War 
II system negatively influenced the elements of boundaries, aids and 
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territories in Africa. He is different from other authors in his refusal of the 
idea that European model of state is appropriate for this continent. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES ON STATE 
FAILURE 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The classical discourse on state failure focuses on historical (such as colonial 
legacy) or individual aspects (such as leadership decisions), but mostly 
overlooks the global context. This chapter will provide an analysis of the 
literature on state failure that focuses on the effects of global political 
economy, imperialism, development aids and unsuccessful macroeconomic 
policies (Mistry, 1991; Walle, 2004; Gruffydd Jones, 2008). This chapter 
explores the literature which states that together with the internal causes, 
external factors are also quite influential in state failure. What is different in 
this literature is that whereas the literature analyzed in the previous chapters 
others considered the root causes emanating from local (regime structure) or 
regional factors (colonial history and its legacy), this group of authors 
analyze global economic factors.  
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Percy S. Mistry, Nicholas Van de Walle and Branwen Gruffydd Jones are 
the main authors of this chapter who will analyze the state failure from 
global economic context. Percy Mistry (1992) states that African Debt Crisis is 
related to the current phenomenon of state failure. According to her, the debt 
crisis affected the institutional and human capacity of the African countries 
to implement good economic policies. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2008) 
presents a socio-political-economical perspective and argues that pre-colonial 
and colonial economies, processes of class formation and globalization 
should be examined in order to understand state failure issue.  
Nicholas Van de Walle (2004) in the final section argues that development 
aids and macroeconomic policies have an effect on the causes of state failure. 
 
4.2 Mistry and African Debt Crisis  
 
Percy S. Mistry worked in prominent organizations such as World Bank, 
UNDP, UNCTAD and IFC and served high-ranking positions as an adviser, 
consultant and manager director. His specialization areas are development, 
debt, privatization and adjustment to multilateral institutions. Among his 
publications are ‚African Debt: The Case for Relief for Sub-Saharan Africa‛ 
(1989), Present Role of the World Bank in Africa (1990), African Debt Revisited: 
Procrastination or Progress (1992), ‚Africa’s Record of Regional Cooperation 
and Integration‛ (2000), ‚Financing for Development: Perspectives and 
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Issues‛(2002), ‚Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development Deficit that 
the Commission for Africa did not Consider‛ (2005). 
Percy’s study entitled ‚African Debt: The Case for Relief for Sub-
Saharan Africa‛ analyzes the causes and dimensions of the debt crisis in 
depth and suggests policy responses to the problem. As a result of this 
article, a remarkable group of African and Northern parliamentarians came 
together in a conference and adopted a comprehensive action plan for 
African debt relief in July 1991. Before explaining the external economic 
reasons of the state failure, the key events of 1970s and 1980s that destroy 
many of the economies in Africa, namely, the debt crisis will be overviewed 
as this will shed insight about the current crisis of the state and economies of 
the African states. 
Mistry (1992: 9) argues that in addition to the factors emanating from 
inside such as poor governance, corrupt leaderships, prolonged civil wars, 
excessive spending and inaccurate economic policies of the governments, 
external factors also played an important role in Africa’s crisis. The 1973 oil 
shock caused an immediate tension between OPEC countries and USA by 
leading to an increase in oil prices. The global monetary shocks of 1979-1981 
had a collateral effect by inducing a long and deep recession. Debt-ridden 
developing countries are affected particularly from the shocks where the recession 
lasted for 70 months instead of 16 in the OECD world, and [this] caused commodity 
markets and prices to collapse (Mistry, 1992: 10). Volatile exchange rate 
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movements in the 1980s resulted in increasing the dollar value of Africa’s 
debts, and ‚protectionism in world’s markets for agricultural products and 
low technology manufactures < makes it particularly difficult for African 
counties to diversify and increase exports to hard currency markets‛ (Mistry, 
1992: 11). In 1970s, exports to the developed nations constituted a major 
outcome for Africa. An important portion of the income was gained from the 
taxes on trade. However, with decline in the growth rate of the seven 
developed countries (namely the G7) trade taxes that entered in African 
governments’ budgets has declined as well. The fiscal crisis deepened due to 
the interventionist economic policies of the African countries. By the end of  
1990, debt of Africa had risen to over $270 billion. 
  Table 1 Growth of the African Debt Burden 1982-1990 (Amounts in Billions of US Dollars) 
 1982 1986 1990 
North Africa  
Total Debt Disbursed 
and Outstanding 
67.80 91.68 107.19 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
Total Debt Disbursed 
and Outstanding 
72.48 115.40 162.87 
Continental Africa  
Total Debt Disbursed 
and Outstanding 
140.28 207.08 270.06 
Table from (Mistry 1992: 18) 
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Table 1 shows the size and pattern of the growth of this debt (Mistry, 
1992: 18). Year 1982 indicates the emergence of the crisis; 1986 specifies the 
year in which it is understood that an urgent action is needed to relieve debt 
burden of low-income countries; and year 1990 shows the peak level of the 
debt. This table also marks and shows separately the debt burden of (a) 
North Africa compromising five middle income countries (Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and (b) Sub Saharan Africa compromising forty five 
countries excluding Namibia and South Africa. The debt burden increased 
dramatically from 1982 to 1986. 
The table shows that the debt in both of the two sub-regions has 
increased intensely since 1982, despite the little borrowing for development 
investment since then. Also, the debt has grown more rapidly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa between 1986-90 than in North Africa, although in this period sub 
Saharan African countries supposed take special attention with the 
application of Venice terms in 1987 and Toronto terms in 1988. 
During the period between 1986 and 1990, Africa’s debt burden 
considerably worsened. The price of money, trade and interest rates are were 
all controlled by state. But because of the lack of democratic checks and 
balances that regulates borrowing and spending, decisions could not become 
effective and the policies that are undertaken resulted in fiscal deficits and 
balance of payments crises. ‚Continent’s output stagnated and exports fell 
with the relative performance of the two sub-regions being markedly 
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different‛ (Mistry, 1992: 20). In this vicious cycle, public expenditures that 
favor patronage and rent seeking were accentuated instead of public 
investment. Mistry (1991: 20) argues that debt crisis management in Africa 
between 1982-90 had failed dismally. 
In addition to aforementioned reasons of crisis, exogenous forces 
deteriorated the economy of the states as well in the mid-1980s. The crisis in 
the global political economy due to the oil triggered global recession, led to 
increased price of energy, higher costs of production in developed countries 
and limited the labor number and lowered their income. According to Mistry 
(1992: 21), this meant a decrease in the demand of exports for Africa. As a 
result, public revenues and amount of taxes fell, governments borrowed 
money from abroad and became ineffective by unable to provide any public 
goods to their citizens. 
Massive lending of money was another reason of the debt crisis. 
Donors exerted considerable effort to ameliorate the situation, but because 
the debt problem in Sub Saharan Africa considered as different and relatively 
small than the other developing countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and Middle East, achieving a durable solution became elusive. However, in 
relative terms the debt was much more impairing and grave that it is 
thought, causing steadily decline the per capita income rates of African states 
(Mistry, 1991: 12).   
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The African debt crisis shows how internal and external factors 
worked together and hastened the descent of the economy in such a short 
time. Mercy’s explanation indicates that one of the structural reasons that 
weaken the state institutions is the occurrence of the debt crisis. This crisis is 
also an indicator showing that economic policies can debilitate state 
capacities and internal issues can easily turn into the external ones. 
African debt crisis has important conclusions in terms of the 
emergence of the state failure and collapse. The debt crisis revealed that 
African countries do not have the institutional or human capacity to apply 
good economic policies and good governance. The creditor communities’ 
(OECD and CMEA) negative role is also revealed as their loans to the 
continent have weakened the capacity of independent African states to 
sustain themselves. Mistry (1992: 63) argues that the continent between 1960 
and 1989 ‚has been a large chessboard on which the games of super and sub-
power rivalry in terms of trade, aid and financial flow have been played 
out‛. According to Mistry, Africa was unfortunate because the post-
independence experience of continent-wide economic fiasco left a deep 
legacy of confusion in the continent. Confusion emerged about individual 
and national identity, whom to trust or what course to follow. The 
generation born during or just before the debt crisis and having experienced 
and suffered from it, lacked the sense of direction and confidence that is 
necessary for Africa to maintain recovery. In this sense, the emergence of the 
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state failure can be traced back to the occurrence of the debt crises which 
affected not only economies, but also individuals. 
 
4.3 Gruffydd Jones and Global Capitalism 
 
Branwen Gruffydd Jones is an academic whose research interests focus on 
the global political economy of poverty and development with particular 
reference to Africa, theories and histories of imperialism, colonialism and 
neo-colonialism, discourse and practice concerning failed states in 
contemporary imperialism, African political thought and postcolonial cities. 
She is currently working as a lecturer at University of London. Some of her 
published works include ‚Africa and the Poverty of International Relations‛ 
(2005), Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach (2006), 
Decolonising International Relations (2006) as editor, ‚The Global Political 
Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the ‘Failed State’ 
Ideology‚(2008).  
Gruffydd Jones (2008) argues that external conditions such as 
globalization and global capitalism are elements that have rendered states 
weak and unstable. Together with Fukuyama (2004) Gruffydd Jones explains 
prevalent crises in states with global political economy approach. Fukuyama 
argues that state failure has a number of distinct causes including economic 
development level, failure made by the former colonial powers, drawing of 
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arbitrary post-colonial borders, lack of democracy, misgovernment, 
widespread poverty, heavy dependence on foreign aid, and problematic 
programs presented by international institutions such as IMF or the IBRD. 
However he states that all of these causes revealed and the right 
environment is emerged with the end of the Cold War. 
Recalling the first chapter, Rotberg and Zartman (1995, 2002) had 
argued that the destructive decisions of the individual leaders pave the way 
to state failure. According to Gruffydd Jones (2008: 184), such an approach 
categorizes the causes of failure in terms of internal agency by showing little 
regard to history, structure and the international. The author contends that 
there is insufficient attention to the deeply historical and structural causes of 
crises in neocolonial states. Therefore, Gruffydd Jones argues that the 
structural crises in African states can be better explained by examining the 
historical legacy of colonial rule in modern state formation, the specific 
character of state’s postcolonial political economy and its structured insertion 
into the regional and global capitalist system.  
According to Gruffydd Jones (2008: 185), the notion of ‚failed state‛ is 
more than just a label and should be investigated within a broader approach 
that provides a socio-political-economical understanding. The current 
discourse on failed state assumes that historical developments of particular 
states are isolated from economic and social relations, which constitute 
society. In the cases of failed or collapsed states, two key themes are usually 
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put forward as the cause: bad leadership and the specific culture 
characterized by factionalist groups or clanism. However, Gruffydd Jones 
argues that it is necessary to examine the nature of the pre-colonial and 
colonial political economy, and processes and accumulation of class 
formation, the relationship between colonial rule and logic of colonial 
imperialism. 
According to Gruffydd Jones (2008), the colonial rule of Africa under 
Europeans at the end of nineteenth century brought both economic and 
strategic imperatives to the African states. States experienced qualitative 
changes as a result of the incorporation of society into global capitalist 
economy and world market. With imperialism, non-European states were 
integrated into global capitalist system and various forms of colonial and 
postcolonial states and economies have appeared. Gruffydd Jones argues 
that such a background prevents a generalized theory of the postcolonial 
state, but still some points can still be specified. First, although in Europe 
there existed social classes of proletariat and bourgeoisie, in other parts of the 
world different patterns of class relations has emerged as a result of the 
colonial rule. The specific particularities of these class relations affected the 
character of the state in general. Second, the protracted colonial rule under 
European powers created transformations in economies such as international 
division of labor and unequal economic structures on a global scale. Third, 
new articulations of political and economic power in colonized states have 
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appeared as a result of the imposition of European rule. Overall, Gruffydd 
Jones (2008: 192) argues that interactions between these three factors explain 
the appearance of corruption, authoritarianism and elite rivalry in the 
African states. Additionally, economic underdevelopment and the class basis 
of the postcolonial state led to rivalries among different groups. In the case of 
Somalia, for instance, clan rivalry and competition is rooted in social 
relations of the colonial and neocolonial political economy. In other words, 
Gruffydd Jones (2008: 192) argues that ubiquitous rivalries in African states 
rely on not culture as it is sometimes assumed, but the ‚specific structure of 
the colonial economy and the mercantile form of accumulation and 
underdevelopment‛. 
Accordingly, Gruffydd Jones’s perspective indicates that the problem 
of state failure is not primarily local in origin. Globally structured social, 
historical and economic processes have a huge impact on the issue of state 
failure. The form of the colonial economy had implications for the character 
of the colonial and post-colonial state. Until the Second World War, colonial 
state was developed remotely. Gruffydd Jones’s view requires inquiring into 
the nature of pre-colonial and colonial political economy, colonial 
imperialism and the relationships between different classes and their effects 
on economic activities. In this regard, her perspective considers state failure 
from a historical and global economic perspective. Like Walle, Gruffydd 
Jones also considers the role of the foreign aid. She posits that financial 
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foreign aid causes weakening of the economic structure and in the case of 
countries that were dependent on financial aid throughout the colonial 
period, their economy did not develop. As a result, international division of 
labor and the entry to the world market has created a chronic balance of 
payments deficit.  
 
4.4 Walle, Development Aids and Bad Macroeconomic Policies 
 
Nicholas Van de Walle is a professor at Cornell University. His research 
areas include comparative politics, democratization, effectiveness of foreign 
aid, and politics of economic reform and political economy of development, 
with a special focus on Africa. His recent books are African Economies and the 
Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (2001) and Overcoming Stagnation in Aid 
Dependent Countries (2005). 
In pointing out the roots causes of state failure, Walle (2004: 98-112) 
distinguishes between structural and contingent factors. According to Walle, 
structural factors are deeply ingrained economic and sociological 
characteristics that are fixed in the short to medium term. Fiscal or extractive 
capacity of the states is the most important institutional capability for weak 
states. The level of extraction determines the activities that states can sustain 
and the quality of the public infrastructure. For instance, agrarian economies 
with weak market institutions, low urbanization and low population density 
 69 
 
are difficult to tax. Thus, low levels of development tend to weaken state 
structure and fiscal resources available to these states become significantly 
lower than those available to the economies of the OECD countries. 
According to Walle (2004: 104), in sub-Saharan Africa the presence of these 
structural factors are striking, but they can only explain the propensity to 
fail. The move from weakness to failure to collapse however largely results 
from contingent factors. As defined by Walle (2004: 104), ‚contingent factors 
[are] short term events arising from the actions of political and economic 
agents‛. External economic challenges such as major commodity price 
fluctuations, droughts, famines or coups can be counted as contingent 
factors. Walle (2004: 104) argues that in the case of state failure, two 
contingent factors propel the movement from weakness to failure. The first 
factor is the development aid relationship between the donors and the 
recipients and the second factor is the bad macroeconomic policies that are 
implemented by states. 
According to Walle, regarding these factors, one perspective in the 
literature argues that states, which are more dependent on foreign aid are 
structurally weak to deal with the challenges of state building. Some 
suggests that this is a paradox of decolonization in Africa (Herbst, 1996-
1997), and others including Walle (2004) rest their reasoning on the European 
capitalist framework. He argues that foreign development aid and structural 
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adjustment policies influenced economic activities of the developing states 
since the end of the Cold War. 
Throughout the period from 1950 to 1995, developing African 
countries did not only receive military and technical assistance, but were also 
supported by European countries through foreign aid. Aid has traditionally 
been seen by donors as a temporary grant and is given to countries to 
complement their existing national resources. But in the case of Africa it 
became a permanent and indispensable aspect of economic life. After the 
decolonization period, colonial powers such as France and Britain 
maintained their presence by providing aid to the newly independent states. 
The donor countries have increased the amount of such aid as a result of the 
debt crisis in Africa in 1970s. In addition to that, structural adjustment 
programs have been applied to improve the policy environment in those 
weak states. Walle (2004: 108) indicates that from 1980 to 1993, official 
development assistance (ODA) that Africa received increased from 24 
percent to 37 percent. This is an astounding number. 
The change in the post-Cold War world economy influenced the aid 
recipients negatively. Serious changes occurred in this period. First, with the 
end of the Cold War, security motives of donors have largely disappeared 
and consequently foreign aid has declined. Throughout the Cold War, 
‚superpowers were concerned with cultivating clients in all parts of the 
world and therefore were willing to help African nations rush ethnic 
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rebellions or threats from neighbors‛ (Herbst, 2004: 306). A secret 1963 
United States document reveals that along with keeping Africa free of 
communists, another aim of the U.S. was ‚to restrain violence in general and 
preserve the present territorial order as the most feasible alternative to 
chaos‛ (Howland, 1963: 331). During the Shaba rebellions, a substantial aid is 
granted to Zaire. Likewise, the Soviet Union gave Ethiopia its military 
support in exchange for resisting Somalia’s irredentist claims. However, the 
end of the Cold War resulted in American and Soviet withdrawal from the 
region. Since then, less attention has been paid to the political stability of the 
aid recipient countries except the boundary maintenance issue. For instance, 
President Laurent Kabila of Zaire (now known as Democratic Republic of 
Congo) was threatened by a rebellion in eastern part in 1998. When he asks 
the support of the Americans, United States immediately said that it wanted 
‚the government in Kinshasa to be in position to control its territory‛ and 
‚believe*d+ strongly in the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo‛ (Erlanger, 1998), despite the evidence showed that such integrity did 
not exist. Secondly, donor countries have faced economic stringencies, which 
urged them to focus on their own economies rather than others. For instance, 
the United States had to deal with the issues of volatility in asset markets, 
trade deficits and perverse interest rate relationships (Waller, 1999). 
Likewise, Russian economy was also in bad shape. Existence of the so-called 
shadow economy led to no taxes or government statistics during that period. 
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In 1994, national gross domestic product (GDP) was 604 trillion rubles or 
about the four percent of the United States GDP for that year. And thirdly, as 
a result of the changes in Russia and Eastern Europe, competition for the aid 
has increased. In such an economic conjuncture, the system that once 
supported the aid recipients, abstained from giving. United States for 
instance, reduced its aid to Somalia from $450-500 million a year from $186 
million in 1991. 
By arguing that reduction of development aid is not the cause of the 
state failure or civil conflicts, De Walle disagrees with group of authors who 
associated the sharp increases in the number of civil conflicts of the early 
1990s in Africa with the changes in the international context (Gurr, 1980, 
1992; Steadman, 1996). Steadman for instance argues that two external factors 
have given rise to internal conflicts and undermined the external support for 
Africa. These external factors are end of the Cold War and dissemination of 
free market ideas. Likewise, Gurr and Duvall argued that there is a strong 
link between external economic dependence and heightened vulnerability to 
various forms of civil disorder. According to them, the reductions in the 
foreign aid, state failure and the rise of the internal conflicts are interrelated 
with each other (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Laitin, 1999). The view was that the 
sharp declines in resources due to the end of the Cold War have triggered 
state failure. Laitin (1999) argued that cutback of resources results ‚war of 
attrition‛ between rival clans. He gave the example of Somalia to this 
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situation. Similarly Woodward (1995) highlighted structural adjustments as 
the perpetrator of the collapse of Yugoslavia. These authors suggested that 
foreign aid cuts may be the reason behind state failure and the violent 
conflicts that followed.  
According to Walle, however, the factors identified above are not the 
causes of the state failure. The author argues that there are two widespread 
and overlapping premises in this literature. The first premise is that, the end 
of the Cold War caused the departure of the West from the region, but at the 
same time cutoffs overstrained African states. The second premise is the rise 
of market oriented SAPs in the early 1980s weakened the states. Walle (2004: 
110-111) also thinks that these two factors have influenced state failure. 
However, although he agrees that SAPs have weakened state strength and 
political stability in these countries, he doesn’t accept that there is an aid 
decline with the end of the Cold War. The author contends that aid to Africa 
underwent a dramatic increase throughout the 1980s (Walle, 2004: 109). 
However, Walle (2004: 111) argues, substantial increases in aid resources to 
the region allowed governments to avoid the kind of reform that might have 
led to economic growth and peaceful political change Weak conditionality 
strengthened rent-seeking politicians and corruption and led to declines in 
the role of technocrats who were willing to pursue rationalization of 
decision-making. Also, foreign aid did not bring the renewal of economy. On 
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the contrary vigorous persistence of fiscal crises has continued with the 
convenience of aids.  
Walle’s perspective indicates that countries become vulnerable to 
failure not because of decline of foreign aid cuts, but because of its increase 
which prevented reform in structural economic features such as low levels of 
economic activity and decline in state capacity. The external factors such as 
SAPs and foreign aids weakened the recipient country’s state structures. As a 
result, responding to crises became a difficult task. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzed the literature that considers economic factors and their 
effects on the weakening of economy and state capacity. In accordance with 
the prominent authors’ studies, colonial imperialism, global capitalism and 
foreign aid have been discussed. 
Mistry looked at the African Debt Crisis. During the 1970s, several 
changes that occurred in the political and economic conjuncture repressed 
developing states of the Africa. When this conjecture combines with the 
wrong economic policies of the governments, a debt crisis is occurred. Mistry 
argued that the experience of the debt crisis in the post-independence period 
in Africa resulted in continent-wide economic and political failure and has 
left a troubling legacy of confusion and ambiguity. However, his explanation 
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is insufficient in the sense that it does not discuss the effect of the historical 
viewpoint of pre-colonial and colonial economies. In this regard, his 
argument is weaker than Gruffydd Jones’ global economic and historical 
perspective. 
Gruffydd Jones looked at the state failure issue from a global 
economic and historical perspective. She argued that unlike the generally 
accepted argument that identify the reasons of state failure as local in origin, 
global structural factors such as class relationships, colonial imperialism, pre 
and colonial practices, states’ incorporation in the global capitalist 
framework engender the issue. Gruffydd Jones’ explanation of state failure is 
more comprehensive than Mistry’s and most of the second chapter authors 
who examine the colonial legacies as the cause of the failure without 
regarding the global economy.  
Walle explained the state failure with the particular focus on 
development aids and bad macroeconomic policies and their disastrous 
effects on state capacity. He asked and analyzed whether foreign aid and 
structural adjustment programs strengthen the state structure. The 
assumption in the literature was that the foreign aid cuts after the Cold War 
led to the state failure. However, Walle objected this view by contending that 
there was never a foreign aid cut. According to the author, the amount of aid 
has increased after the withdrawal of the West, however this aid was not 
beneficial for the recipient state either. Instead of strengthening and 
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restructuring economy, foreign aid actually deteriorated the state capacity by 
drifting states into a peace of mind. Walle’s explanation is similar to the 
Gruffydd Jones’ in terms of focusing on foreign aid and its impact on state 
failure. However, while Gruffydd Jones argues that development aid cuts 
has also a role in weakening states, Walle contests that it is not the cuts or 
cessations but the actuality and the continuation of the aids that causes state 
failure. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CRITICAL APPROACHES AND STATE FAILURE 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the literature that questions the phenomenon of the 
state failure from a critical theory perspective. It will look at the distinctive 
arguments of the scholars in the literature who do not accept the idea that all 
states constitute and function in the same way. Therefore, this chapter will 
criticize the general approaches that identify and categorize the root causes 
of state failure and presents alternative questions and viewpoints about the 
issue. 
The key authors of this chapter are Milliken and Krause (2002), Bøås 
and Jennings (2005, 2007) and Bilgin and Morton (2002, 2004). In the first 
section, Milliken and Krause’s ‚institutional‛ and ‚functional‛ dimension of 
state failure will be looked at. According to them, the way the concept is 
understood is problematic. Therefore, they stressed that the general 
approaches that deal with the issue do not solve anything. They (2002) argue 
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that what is failing is not the state, but our vision about the state. The second 
part will present the view of Bøås and Jennings who argue that labeling 
states as ‚successful‛ or ‚failed‛ is actually the real problem. They examine 
how the Western states employ the concept of failed state to justify their 
interventions to the developing world and use the ‚failed state as security 
threat‛ scenario to their interests. In the third section, Bilgin and Morton 
argue that the Cold War discourse which categorizes states as ‚failed‛ versus 
‚successful‛ has continued and the practitioners of this discourse focus on 
the supposed symptoms of state failure rather than the conditions that let 
this failure. 
 
5.2 Milliken and Krause and Misconception of State Failure 
 
Jennifer Milliken is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies in Geneva who published articles and books including The Social 
Construction of the Korean War: Conflict Possibilities (2002) and ‚State Failure, 
State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies‛ 
(2002) which she co-wrote with Keith Krause. Keith Krause is a Professor at 
the Graduate Institute of International Development Studies in Geneva and 
Director of Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding Programme. 
His research interests include armed conflicts and violence, arms control, 
human security, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction policy, 
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and state building and sovereignty. Amongst his publications are Arms and 
the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (1995) and co-edited book 
Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies (1997).  
Milliken and Krause argue (2002: 753) that current discourse on failed 
or collapsed states are based on two implicit yardsticks. The first one is 
related to the ‚stateness‛ in which any given state should be measured as 
having succeeded or failed, referred as the institutional dimension of the 
state collapse. The second standard is the functional dimension, which deals 
with the basic and normative implications of the state failure. Most of the 
claims about state failure in the literature rest upon these two benchmarks. In 
other words, the possibility of state failure is measured either with the 
achievement of modern statehood or with the functioning of the state. In 
both cases, state failure is closely linked with the process of statehood and 
limited itself within the boundaries of this understanding.  
The traditional perspectives start from an established assumption that 
there is an appropriate form of order and political organization in statehood 
as Milliken and Krause (2002: 762) argue. Therefore, viable and successful 
statehood is defined in accordance with expectations that a state should 
fulfill. Conversely, states labeled as ‚failed‛ or ‚collapsed‛ when they are 
unable to meet these given standards. This traditional understanding of state 
failure is closely linked with the view of modern statehood that considers 
states alike and s functioning in the same way. This way of thinking has 
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important implications of how we comprehend state failure. Milliken and 
Krause (2002: 754) argue that ‚the scope of the phenomenon of state *failure] 
depends in large part on how one defines [the concept+‛. In parallel with this 
argument, Doornbos (2002: 798) argues that depending on the understanding 
of collapse, one can possibly regard state collapse as part of the processes of 
state reconfiguration and formation. On this account, Doornbos argue that in 
the case of a state failure or collapse, a state does not necessarily disintegrate 
in the end, but reconstruct itself even stronger than before. This view also 
reverses the established understanding of state failure is a negative concept. 
Therefore, based on the definition, the scope of the concept may actually 
change. 
Even though the concept of state failure changes with regard to how 
one defines it, many states deal with the internal crisis by unable to provide 
basic public goods, security, order and wealth to its citizens today. As a 
result, a vacuum of power depending on the collapse of the central authority, 
internal violence and human insecurities are witnessed in the developing 
world. Thus, as Milliken and Krause (2002: 755) argued, this ongoing crisis 
on statehood requires one to look alternative solutions rather than judging 
states in terms of systematic dichotomies. However, the prevalent 
understanding, which expects states to perform in accordance with the given 
goals does not explain the ongoing crisis in states. According to Milliken and 
Krause (2002: 755), ‚the linked concepts of state failure and collapse must 
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resonate with a broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and 
legitimacy of modern states‛ or it might serve as a harbinger to a wider 
phenomenon like ‚canary in the mineshaft‛. 
Milliken and Krause analyze the modern state in the dynamic 
historical context. The appearance of the modern state dates back to the 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which settled the Thirty Years War. The treaties 
constitute the modern statehood, which is the outcome of a long process of 
economic, social and political developments. Sovereign and territorially 
based entities constitute the modern state by controlling vast territories with 
secular rulers. In its earliest form, political elites who want to consolidate 
their power provide security to the populace, but in exchange they collect 
resources and strengthen their hold on power. Sovereignty was more than 
just a formal, juridical label‛, rather it was substantial (Sorensen, 1999: 27). 
The leaders often aspired to sovereignty, but it was seldom achieved, 
because of little control they were able to exercise over their territories. With 
the liberal tradition, a social contract tradition that guarantees order is 
established between the rulers and citizens. Practice of political economy 
gave rise to the preservation of property rights and markets.  
Based on aforementioned narratives of state formation, three core 
functions, namely providing security, representation and welfare, of a state 
are prevalently assumed. By reifying the functions of the state, it is argued 
that states succeed when they fulfill these functions and in the same way, 
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they fail when they are unable to meet these functions (Milliken and Krause, 
2002: 756). This assumption, derived from the formation of modern state, 
presupposes that modern statehood is the only viable and appropriate form 
of political organization that a state can exist. Therefore, concept of state 
failure is limited within the narratives of modern statehood. 
Milliken and Krause accept that there are increasing incidences of 
crisis in contemporary states. According to them, the phenomenon of state 
failure challenges the Westphalian assumption that states are the ultimate 
construct in international relations theory. Therefore, as Milliken and Krause 
suggests state failure is not only a local problem, but is a potential source of 
insecurities for the core states of international society, which threatens the 
modern project of achieving political order. Scholars and policy makers have 
adopted a vision of the role of the state in post-colonial world that combined 
security, representation and welfare. However, the vision that new states 
were to build legitimate nations, providing these goals within a shortest 
period of time after their independence is somewhat naive (Milliken and 
Krause, 2002: 762). In this regard, such success is only possible  
if the idea of state is taken completely out of its historical context 
and regarded as an institutional form that owes little or nothing to 
the historical forces that created it (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 
762). 
 
Therefore, as Milliken and Krause (2002: 762) concludes what has failed or 
collapsed 
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is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive, developmental 
state that sustained the generations of academics, activists and 
policy-makers, than any real existing state. 
 
5.3 Bøås and Jennings and Problem with Labeling 
 
Morten Bøås is the head of research at the University of Oslo working in the 
areas of Central and West Africa and Southeast Asia with the focus of 
security and development, conflict, regions and regionalisation and 
multilateral institutions and development. Kathleen M. Jennings is a 
researcher in Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo. Bøås 
and Jennings co-write articles and book chapters about state failure including 
‚Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the Failed State‛ (2005), 
‚’Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats and Opportunities‛ (2007) and 
‚Rebellion and Warlordism: The Spectre of Neopatrimonialism‛ (2012).  
According to Bøås and Jennings, the phenomenon of state failure is 
not new, but the issue has increasingly attracted attention since 2001. Bøås 
and Jennings (2007: 476) argue that after this date, the way that the concept is 
understood and operationalized became problematic. They argue (2007: 477) 
that the concept of failed state is based on a flawed assumption that all states 
are similar and function in the same way, which neglects the major 
differences in state formation. Therefore, policy responses to fix failed states 
rest upon generic solutions that are unable to help the situation. 
Furthermore, the concept is used extensively by Western states in order to 
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justify interventions, rather than offering effective policy formulations (Bøås 
and Jennings, 2007: 476). Thus, failed state is just a political label that 
Western states utilize when their interests are at stake. Therefore, a 
clarification is needed to bring meaning to the failed state concept. First, one 
should ask for whom the state is failing and how? Such a questioning reveal 
that conditions and structures that bring states in the cusp of failure may be 
done deliberately by Western powers and thus, states called ‚failed‛ when 
they pose a threat to Western interests (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 476). In 
other words, even though they are weak, failing or failed, states are only 
considered as ‚failed‛ and assumed to represent a security threat to Western 
world, when they are unwilling to function according to the given model.  
Bøås and Jennings also examine the circumstances under which failed 
state label is or is not applied. According to them, many states experience 
security, humanitarian and governance crises commonly associated with 
failed states, but the failed state label attached only some of them. In other 
states, the feature of ‚state functioning is not only accepted, but also to a 
certain degree facilitated, as it creates an enabling environment for business 
and international capital‛ (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 476). Bøås and Jennings 
use the Afghanistan case to show the ‚failed state as security threat‛ 
scenario. Several years prior to 9/11, Taliban was in power in Afghanistan 
and according to Bøås and Jennings, Taliban’s actions such as human rights 
abuses or harbouring terrorists were tolerated because they were managed to 
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bring stability to the country. In 1996, Osame bin Laden moved to 
Afghanistan from Sudan and established a alliance between Taliban and his 
al-Qaeda organisation. After Taliban came to power, U.S. were eager to 
persuade Taliban to sign the construction of a pipeline agreement. However, 
as the Clinton administration ended and Bush came to power, relations were 
deteroirated over time. The discussions about the pipeline project continued 
almost until the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Brisard and Dasquie, 2002). 
Until the attacks, the relationship between U.S. and Afghanistan ‚did not 
dwell on the extent to which Afghanistan was a failed state, ... but rather 
centered on the gospel of oil and geopolitics‛ (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 479). 
Bøås and Jennings argue that the 2001 terrorist attacks radically altered this 
dynamic. The human rights situation under Taliban suddenly received a 
humanitarian justification for offensive intervention. Furthermore, six 
months after the incident President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan signed an 
agreement with Pakistan and Turkmenistan about construction of a pipeline 
from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Thus, although the 
intervention in Afghanistan was driven more by fear and revenge than oil, in 
the post-intervention period, Western interests are clearly reflected. 
According to Bøås and Jennings (2007: 479), it is significant that ‚the 
intervention in Afghanistan ... had little to do with any humanitarian or 
governance based conception of  state failure‛. 
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5.4 Bilgin and Morton and Persistence of the Cold War Discourse 
 
Adam David Morton teaches at University of Nottingham. He specializes in 
themes of political economy, state theory, historical sociology, globalization 
and development. He is the author of "The ‘Failed State’ of International 
Relations‛ (2005) and Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political 
Economy of Uneven Development (2011). Pınar Bilgin teaches at Bilkent 
University. She specializes in critical approaches to security studies. She is 
the author of The Middle East: A Critical Perspective (2005). Bilgin and 
Morton’s coauthored publications about state failure include ‚Historicizing 
Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the 
Social Sciences?‛ (2002) and ‚From ‘Rouge’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of 
Short-termism‛ (2004). 
According to Bilgin & Morton, there has been a recent shift in U.S. 
policymaking interest from ‘rouge states’ to ‘failed states’. It is argued that 
practices of the Cold War continue to frame the lexicon of state failure (Bilgin 
and Morton, 2002: 56) by facilitating particular interests and policies (Bilgin 
and Morton, 2002: 67). In the case of ‘failed’ versus ‘successful’ state 
opposition, Cold War discourse on statehood still persisted by scholars and 
practitioners.  
Bilgin & Morton (2004: 170) argue that academicians or government 
officials who are interested in state failure want to take immediate action. 
 87 
 
However, rather than the conditions that permit such failure to happen, they 
focused on the supposed symptoms of state failure. The labels that are 
attached to states not only force us to make binary oppositions such as 
‘failed’ versus ‘successful’ states (Bilgin & Morton 2004: 173-174), but also 
assert generalizations that there is an ideal form of statehood that any state 
should aspire to achieve. According to Bilgin and Morton, the factors that led 
some states to fail may actually help us to deepen our understanding and 
take alternative actions. 
Bilgin and Morton (2004: 174) argue that existing approaches accept 
that the intrinsic features of the states cause ‚failures‛, but these approaches 
do not reflect upon the colonial background or the peripheral position of the 
state in global politico-economic structures. A second problem is that the 
prevalent approaches consider state failure and collapse as a ‚deviance‛ 
from the norm which this ‚deviance‛ used both as a justification and 
legitimacy for intervention.  Another neglected problem is the role of the 
structural adjustment programmes and aids that are provided by 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank which intensify the socio-
economic and political environment of the states in the developing world.  
Bilgin and Morton (2004: 174) argue that in order to appreciate state 
failure better, a socio-economic conjuncture in which such a failure emerges 
should be analyzed. Therefore, an alternative approach is needed which 
helps to ‚appreciate better the forces that shape the realms of political 
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economy and security constraining and enabling developing states‛ (Bilgin 
and Morton, 2004: 175). One way to do this is to analyze different processes 
of state formation and historical circumstances which constitute different 
developing states. With this way, different historical and contemporary 
social circumstances and alternative modes of social organizations that 
prevail in the developing world can be appreciated. However, such an 
approach could only work in the long-term according to Bilgin and Morton. 
In the final analysis, Morton and Bilgin argues that United States’ Cold 
War policy to support Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and Taliban regime 
of Afghanistan has eventually backfired by creating instability in those states. 
Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of state failure which reflects the 
role of Western states have played in failing them through various 
interventions should be considered. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked at the literature that analyzes the reasons of state 
failure based on the critical approaches. The authors of this chapter argue 
that the way that the ‚failed state‛ concept has been understood and 
conceptualized is flawed. Even the failed state label is inherently political 
and based on the Western perceptions of Western security and interests. 
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Milliken and Krause argued that state failure is a potential source of 
insecurities which threatens the modern project of achieving political order. 
They pointed out that it is nearly impossible for the new states to achieve a 
combined security, representation and welfare. Such success is only possible 
by taking the state out of its historical context. Therefore, they argued that 
what has failed or collapsed is only the vision of the developmental state. 
Bøås and Jennings argued that a dichotomy of ‚successful‛ versus 
‚failed‛ is the real problem behind state failure. It is not just misleading, but 
also reductive and ahistoric. Because of the vision of modern statehood in 
mind, concept of state failure is reduced into a mere choice and labeling 
states become a more convenient way for developed world in order to justify 
policy interventions. To limit the boundaries of failed states in this rhetoric is 
problematic again, because the policy responses to state failure or collapse 
also automatically limit its scope. 
Bilgin and Morton argued that the thinking and practices that 
prevailed during the Cold War still continues in the present day. The post-
colonial states that appeared in the making of the ‚Third World‛ are now 
categorized in terms of their deficiency of failure. A better appreciation of the 
state failure is needed according to them, but this is unlikely to appear unless 
a socio-economic conjuncture that such failure emerges is analyzed.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The mid-1990s was a time when multiple state failures and collapses in 
Africa became relevant to the international community. Before the 1990s, 
despite the collapse of states such as Congo (now Zaire), Chad and Ghana, 
an international response was not directed at these states. Since the end of 
the Cold War, state failure has been embraced as a global concern on the 
Yugoslav wars of disintegration, violence in Caucasus and the turmoil in 
Haiti (Yannis, 2002: 819). The issue of state failure began to be viewed as a 
security concern especially after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 9/11 
attacks ‚have created a situation in which the international community in 
general and the Security Council in particular are even more likely to 
support interventions in failed or failing states‛ (Einsiedel, 2005: 21) because 
after this incident, failed states started to be equated with warlordism, 
violent conflict and terrorist harboring. Additionally, state failure became a 
key focus of both scholarly analysis (Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 
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2004) and policy development (US National Security Doctrine, EU Security 
Doctrine, High-Level Panel on Threats). 
In today’s globalized world, with advanced information systems and 
interlaced security, existence of the failed states might have serious 
repercussions not only for those states and their people, but also for their 
neighbors and their citizens. Humanitarian challenges such as refugee flows, 
violence, human smuggling and endemic diseases; security challenges such 
as extremism, terrorist harboring and drug trafficking and legal challenges 
such as lack of functioning government and inability of government to 
participate international treaties indicate that state failure and collapse is a 
rising problem. The cases of Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Haiti, Cote d’Ivore and 
Balkan states display the best examples of this problem. 
The thesis presented an overview of existing approaches to crises 
engendered by such failure of states. The reasons of state failure have been a 
long debated issue. Approaches in each chapter focused on different 
understandings of the root causes of state failure. 
Chapter 1 looked at the literature that focused on leadership factor 
and the regime malfunction from an individual and local level of analysis. 
While the main focus is the leadership capabilities, legacy of indirect 
colonialism has also an effect shaping the system and context. Therefore, 
traits such as despotic systems, emergence of tribal leaders, bifurcated state 
are apparent. Independence period created the context which generated a 
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politics based on political patronage, namely, clientelism or 
neopatrimonialism. 
The literature that adopts a post-colonial approach is presented in the 
second chapter. The importance of the colonial legacy had more to do with 
the viability and sustainability of the state over the long run. Therefore, the 
colonial past is examined by this literature the chapter focusing on territorial 
settlements, border demarcations and historical state system. Clearly, despite 
the changes in the statehood, state as the overarching construct is still critical 
for the establishment of stable and prosperous societies in the continent. 
Institutions of the state also remain the primary vehicle for providing 
functions for any given population, in particularly, security and order. 
The literature that adopts a global political approach is presented in 
the third chapter. This literature looks at issues of global political economical 
practices, globalization and development aid. The chapter indicates that 
external factors are also quite penetrating as well as local ones since the 
effects of globalization, development aids of Cold War and entry to the 
world market are related to the state failure. 
The fourth chapter looked at the literature that analyses the problem 
from a critical theory perspective and criticizes the current discourse on state 
failure. At the center of the analysis of this literature is a critique of the 
standard perspective which categorizes states as successful, weak, failing, 
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failed or collapsed. Such analyses, critical scholars have argued, ignore the 
changes in the statehood and limit our understanding. 
In the final analysis, scholars present different perspectives on their 
understanding of state failure and therefore, their responses to state failure 
also differs. Individual focused perspective ignores the different 
characteristics, behaviors and worldviews of the leaders and assumes that 
given the same conjuncture, all leaders act in the same way. This approach 
also neglects the colonial history of the states or the effects of the global 
economic practices. Post-colonial approach considers the colonial legacy of 
states as an important factor in state failure, thus it investigates the root 
causes in the history and the process of state formation. However, it does not 
discuss the impact of globalization or the global capitalist networks. The 
global economic approach focuses on global factors, but except Gruffydd 
Jones who also examines the colonialism and economic practices of colonial 
rule, other authors do not analyze the colonial legacy in depth. Among the 
four approaches, the critical approach seems as the most convincing one 
because while other three approaches treat states in the same way and accept 
state failure without questioning, critical approach criticizes this existing idea 
in the literature. Authors in this approach present alternative views about 
state failure which is the strong point of this approach.  
Whether state failure is a security problem or not, it seems that the 
international community cares for these failing states more than before. The 
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bulk of the literature on this issue as reviewed above shows that state failure 
is still an existing concern, notwithstanding changes in labeling. The 
contribution of this thesis to the field has been presenting a comprehensive 
overview and categorization of the literature about the root causes of state 
failure and collapse by presenting organized and categorized chapters. From 
a historical, global political economical and sociological perspective, state 
failure is a problem that is related to individual or state. On the other hand, 
critical perspectives offer a totally new viewpoint by focusing on the way the 
concept has been understood and operationalized. It allows one to ask 
alternative questions about the problem and instead of taking the issue as 
fixed and given, it question the way it is constructed. One should examine 
the whole picture in order to understand the depth of the problem. 
Therefore, different levels of analyses should be incorporated and various 
approaches should be taken into account, when the issue is studied. 
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